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ABSTRACT
The closing decades of the 20th century saw significant policy developments in the
movement to improve business compliance with regulatory and tax requirements.
Previously, controversy about whether a more or less interventionalist approach was
needed dominated discussions of and proposals to enhance regulation. At the core of the
debate were the theoretical assumptions about the motivations driving compliance.
Advocates of the more interventional approach referred to as command-and-control
regulation assume self-interest motivates compliance and a fear of sanctions deters
noncompliance. Those arguing for a less interventional approach known as cooperative
regulation assume civic duty, moral beliefs, fairness and legitimacy of government
determine compliance. More recently, regulatory and tax agencies have adopted a
convergence of the two approaches known as "responsive regulation." Responsive
regulation suggests a wide range of motivations from inadvertent error to self-interest
influence compliance and, thus, require a broad scope of interventions beginning with
dialogue aimed at securing and maintaining engagement in the regulatory process and
ending with a willingness to resort to sanctions when other efforts fail. Investigation
into motivations that influence compliance, especially in the tax arena, have been limited
because of the recency of developments. The available research, however, tends to
support the basic assumptions of responsive regulation. Drawing from interviews with 25
owners of small building and construction firms, the current study provides an increased
understanding of compliance in an industry well recognized for noncompliant taxpayers.
Specifically, it explores participants' taxpaying behaviors and the motivations driving
V

their taxpaying and then compares their taxpaying compliance with compliance in other
regulatory areas. Results suggest that taxpaying among the participants is a complex and
dynamic process which will probably not be accounted for by one theoretical model, that
the tenets of responsive regulation may be the more efficacious intervention and that the
tradition of criminological research may serve well to inform future regulatory and tax
compliance research.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
Drawing from economic and classical theories of crime, rational choice theory
assumes that participation in illegitimate activity is a function of cost and benefit analysis
by rational actors (Becker, 1968; Comish and Clarke, 1986). Specifically, individuals
pursue goals reflecting their self-interest and consciously choose to commit a criminal act
if the expected benefits of illegitimate activity exceed the benefits from engaging in
legitimate activity. Conversely, the decision to forgo criminal behavior may be based on
the individual's perception that the benefits are no longer there or that risk of detection
and subsequent cost of engaging in illegitimate activity is too great. In other words,
individuals explore their options and choose the alternative with the highest expected
gain. Contemporary rational choice theorists acknowledge the calculus of criminal
behavior may on occasion be rudimentary and misinformed but contend that at least some
consideration and rationality direct choices to participate in crime. This decision making
process occurs through two fundamental processes (Comish and Clark, 1986).
First, individuals are heavily influenced by a number of personal factors and
learning experiences in choosing their behavior. Personal factors may include
psychological make-up, social and demographic characteristics and background
characteristics; learning experiences may include direct and vicarious experiences with
criminal activities, contact with enforcement agencies and development of conscience,
moral attitudes and self-perception. While other theorists take account of these factors as
predisposing certain individuals toward a penchant for criminality, rational choice
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theorists reinterpret these factors as influencing the calculus to commit a criminal act. To
wit, individuals who conform in many aspects of their lives may commit a criminal act
and the reverse may also be true.
Second, individuals are influenced by situational and contextual factors. Some
individuals are more likely than others to confront situations where the benefits of
illegitimate activity outweigh the costs. Opportunity, risk of detection, potential
consequences and necessary skills and information vary particularly for different criminal
acts. From the rational choice perspective, decision making models should be "crime
specific"(Comish and Clarke, 1986).
Rational choice theory assigns the state a strong regulatory role in preventing
crime by making it "rational" for individuals to behave so as to reduce negative
consequences. Since businesses by nature operate instrumentally and are typically risk
aversive, threats weighted against potential gains appear particularly ideal for dealing
effectively with their noncompliance (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). Noncompliance
by businesses is seen as willful action by "amoral calculators" who respond to illicit
opportunity by calculating costs and risks (Kagan and Scholz, 1984). The principles of
rational choice theory, therefore, have served as a base for command-and-control
strategies to secure business compliance with regulatory rules. Command-and-control
enforcement incorporates inspections, legal threats and the mechanical imposition of
penalties for noncompliance. Limits are clearly defined in advance and officials readily
increase the pressure to comply including the initiation of legal action when limits are
tested.
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While command-and-control regulation traditionally dominated discussions of
and proposals to enhance regulation, a variety of evidence suggested that its adversarial
nature fosters resentment, mistrust and resistance, at least in some industries and industry
sections. Persistent doubts about its benefits and effectiveness eventually led to calls for
programs of cooperative regulation and enforced self-regulation. Such programs are
distinguished by shared state-corporate responsibility for enforcement and by a wider
range of official options for responding to noncompliance.
Advocates of cooperative regulation contend that individuals tend to obey laws
made and implemented by authorities that are perceived to be legitimate (Tyler, 1990;
Tyler, 1998). They argue that compliance with regulations is influenced by the extent to
which individuals accord legitimacy to enforcement agencies. Legitimacy is a normative
assessment by individuals of the appropriateness or right of enforcement agencies to
restrict their behavior. Therefore, compliance is higher when individuals accord a high
level of legitimacy to enforcement agencies. Achieving compliance is not seen as an
immediate objective but a long-term aim. Preferred methods of enforcement include
persuasion, negotiation and education. However, proposals for and programs of
cooperative regulation also came under fire by critics who questioned whether they can
deliver fairer and more effective outcomes (Snider, 1990; Pearce and Tombs, 1990;
Pearce and Tombs, 1991).
The punishment-versus-persuasion controversy led Ayres and Braithwaite (1992)
to propose a convergence of the two approaches known as "responsive regulation."
Responsive regulation research suggests failure to comply with regulations may result
3

from willfulness but many times it does not. Responsive regulation is grounded in
hierarchical development and application of enforcement strategies that take into account
the circumstances and capabilities of differing business entities. Advocates of responsive
regulation emphasize educating, assisting, and persuading businesses to comply. If they
fail to comply despite appeals and cooperative actions, officials can escalate their
responses and sanctions in proportionate fashion. In other words, as the seriousness of
infractions and the willfulness they represent increase, so do the severity of sanctions. As
Braithwaite (2002: 30) explains, "It is an attempt to solve the puzzle of when to punish
and when to persuade."
Conceptually, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) present their notion of responsive
regulation in the form of a "regulatory pyramid" which is depicted in Figure 1.

Command Regulation with
Nondiscretionary Punishment
Command Regulation with
Discretionary Punishment
Penalties
And Fines
Assistance and Monitoring

Persuasion and Education

Figure 1. Regulatory Pyramid

4

Enforced Self-Regulation
Self-Regulation

The base of the pyramid is made up of broad cooperative strategies of self
regulation that emphasize education about rules and provide assistance with complying.
The top of the sanctions pyramid is represented by a "benign big gun." Ordinarily kept in
the background, it represents the most severe sanctions in the arsenal of regulatory
officials. The availability of the benign big gun, ·coupled with officials' clear willingness
to employ it, serve to push enforcement down toward the base for those who fail to
respond to assistance or to punish those who commit an offense beyond deterrence or
refuse to cooperate. This approach to regulation nurtures voluntary compliance while
displaying a willingness to employ escalating sanctions should the need arise.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 4) suggest officials "be responsive to industry
structure in that different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of
regulation." More specifically, effective responsive regulation requires that officials
understand and take account of the diverse motivational postures taken by those being
regulated. V. Braithwaite ( 1995) identifies four common motivational postures: capture
(acceptance and identity with the regulatory system), managerial accommodation
(incorporation of the firm's own strategies to achieve compliance), resistance
(confrontation and challenge of regulations), and disengagement (withdrawal from the
regulatory process).
Echoing reports of investigators, advocates for responsive regulation contend that
motivations toward noncompliance are not fixed and immutable but qualities that are
subject to shift within the dynamics of the regulatory process. Movement in the direction
of compliance may be accomplished by engaging the owners/managers of business firms
5

in a common regulatory culture with strong social bonds and shared sense of mission.
This assumes that failure to comply may result not only from willfulness but also from
ignorance of what is required, from inadvertent errors, or from changes in circumstances.
In such cases, most are neither resistant to nor disengaged from the system.
Understanding both diverse motivational sources of noncompliance and the need for
mutual respect and trust in contacts with business firms is central to improving
compliance. Thus, business firms who are inclined to comply with the law may be
strengthened in this posture by officials who treat them as trustworthy if confused or
misguided citizens while those of a more resistant bent may be nudged toward
compliance through judicious use of educative efforts laced with a dose of threat. The
more recalcitrant are another matter for they may need to be reminded of or even
experience first hand criminal prosecution or loss of their license to do business.
Investigators have made progress exploring empirically the diverse motivations
for compliance by businesses across a broad spectrum of regulatory programs. Ashford et
al. (1985) found that consistency of enforcement and regulation structure most influential
in motivating businesses to establish and engage in innovative practices to ensure
regulatory compliance. Genn (1993) interviewed management personnel in a wide cross
section of firms in England and Wales to learn about their motivations for compliance
with occupational safety and health requirements. Her study showed that some firms,
particularly the largest ones, are proactive in their approach while others are more
reactive. Firms in the former category approach expressed support for and took actions to
be knowledgeable about and to comply with regulations. Managers of reactive firms by
6

contrast tended to be less informed about regulations and more ad hoc in their compliance
strategies. Typically, their approach to compliance is confined to implementing
improvements demanded by inspectors during visits.
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) asked a sample of 410 Australian nursing homes
executives to estimate the chances that discovery and sanctions would occur under a
condition of continued violation of six standards and regulations and to gauge the costs to
their organization of several sanction types in the event that they were caught and
penalized. Using qualitative methods to assess cross-sectional self-report and official
measures of compliance, they found a formal deterrence model to be a "stark failure"
(Braithwaite and Makkai, 199 1: 29).
Paternoster and Simpson ( 1996) investigated intentions to commit four types of
corporate crime by MBA students. They found that where participants held personal
moral codes, these were more important than rational calculations of sanction threats in
predicting compliance. While sanction threats were found to be somewhat important,
they concluded that appeals to business ethics were more effective.
Bansal and Roth (2000) collected interview data on compliance motivations in
tape recorded interviews with 88 managers in 53 theoretically sampled firms in the
United Kingdom and Japan. The investigators were interested not only in motivations for
compliance but also contextual factors that apparently lead to corporate ecological
responsiveness. Using standard qualitative research techniques of analytic induction, they
identified three common motivations for compliance with environmental protection
regulations: competitiveness, legitimation and ecological responsibility. Competitiveness
7

is belief that compliance may hold potential for improving long-term profitability, for
example, by improved energy and waste management. Legitimation refers to the desire of
a firm to improve the appropriateness of its actions within an established set of
regulations. Ecological responsibility refers to the concern that a firm has for its social
obligations and values.
May (2002) used a mail survey of 260 residential home builders in western
Washington to examine attitudes toward compliance with building codes. His data led
him to distinguish between affirmative and negative motivations. The former are
grounded in a concern for one's general reputation, demands for homes without defects,
confidence in building codes and a sense of duty to comply. The latter are grounded in
fear and potential sanctions associated with noncompliance. Affirmative motivations
were found to be more effective than negative motivations in producing compliance.
Research into motivations for regulatory compliance tend to confirm the basic
assumptions of responsive regulation: "[Improved compliance] will not be accomplished
by considering [firms] one at a time as value-maximizing unitary actors... The drivers of
compliance are plural. By seeing and managing compliance appeals in pyramid fashion
so that reward and trust are favored strategies at the base and tough enforcement at the
peak, we can move responsively to improve compliance by mobilizing appropriate drivers
at propitious moments" (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001: 417-18).
While research into the motivations of regulatory compliance has been of interest
to social scientists for some time, the same has not been true of investigation into the
motivations for tax compliance. Because tax authorities have historically relied so
8

heavily on command-and-control strategies of enforcement, research has been dominated
by economic theorists (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989). Economic theorists concentrate
on estimating the amounts of revenue lost to untaxed economic activity, gathering
sociodemographic characteristics of noncompliant taxpayers and building enforcement
models derived from economic theories. Social science research into tax compliance has
been limited in volume and empirical knowledge has been "best regarded as pioneering
rather than definitive" (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989: viii).
In the past decade, however, social science research into motivations for tax
compliance has become increasingly necessary due to a shift in tax enforcement
strategies. In the United States, the president signed into law the Internal Revenue
Service Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. This act came into law after the
adversarial nature of tactics used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) met with
complaints and criticisms from citizens, the press and, in time, legislators. It establishes a
board that includes private citizens to oversee administration of the IRS, shifts the burden
of proof in civil cases from the taxpayer to the IRS and deemphasizes enforcement
actions while increasing taxpayer education initiatives (Lee and Lipman, 1999; Pace,
2001).

The challenge for social science research is to identify motivations driving
taxpayer compliance and translate findings into practical policy recommendations.
Currently, researchers are limited in their understanding of the motivations driving
compliance with tax requirements (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989; Cash Economy Task
Force, 1998; Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 2001). As a high ranking IRS official
9

notes, "we need to know where groups of taxpayers are having difficulty in complying
with tax law. That would allow us to more effectively deploy resources to help them
understand" (Pace, 2001). The next section addresses what has been learned about
compliance with tax requirements.
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CHAPTER2
TAX COMPLIANCE
While most citizens consider payment of taxes necessary for a sustainable society,
this does not necessarily reflect positive regard for tax law compliance. Tax law is often
considered complex, time-consuming and unfair _leading to justifications for widespread
noncompliance by certain segments of the population. The largest of these segments
includes participants in alternative economies recognized by countries worldwide and
characterized by unreported income (AICPA, 1983; Portes, Castellas, and Benton, 1989;
Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 2001). In Sweden, this phenomenon is referred to
as the "secret economy," in Britain as "fiddling," in Russia as the "second economy" and
in Australia as the "cash economy" (AICPA, 1983; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). In
the United States, the IRS has subdivided the alternative economy into the "illegal
economy" and the "informal economy" (AICPA, 1983). The former includes provisions
of good and services that are illicit such as prostitution, gambling, extortion and drug
dealings. Being illegal, monetary transactions for services are not reported for tax
purposes. The latter comprises income derived from legal employment and business
transactions that are not declared for tax purposes. Typically, income is in the form of
cash that is not recorded in the books from which the tax return is prepared. Guttman
(1977) and Fiege (1978) estimate the informal economy makes up two-thirds of all
unreported income in the United States, and they predict its growth at rates exceeding the
conventional economy. In 1970, the informal economy in the United States was
estimated to comprise between 3.6 and 4.6 percent of the total economy (Schneider,

11

2000). By 1998, this estimate had grown to 8.9 percent of the total economy, an increase
of 168 percent (Schneider, 2000).
Evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the informal economy is made up
of "informal suppliers" (Kagan, 1989; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998; Bajada, 1999).
Informal suppliers are small businesses whose income tends to be received in small
amounts from customers who generally do not keep records of expenditures (Kagan,
1989: 88). They conceal their income by using cash transactions with customers and
suppliers, keeping unsystematic records, selling surplus materials and failing to maintain
a licensed or fixed place of business with visible assets (Kagan, 1989; Bajada, 1999).
Business transactions from informal suppliers are difficult to detect because the "paper
trail" is nonexistent and there is usually no third party reporting. The U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) approximates that self-employed workers report 36 percent of
their income and informal suppliers working on a cash basis report 11 percent (Hite,
1997).
In the closing decades of the 20th century, revenue losses from the informal
economy gained the attention of tax enforcement officials and social scientists (Roth,
Scholz, and Witte, 1989). The former are interested in reversing the trend while the latter
are interested in the theoretical bases for doing so. The two are united in the quest for
answers to the question of what motivates some people toward compliance with tax law
and others toward noncompliance. As noted previously, since command-and-control
tactics dictated enforcement by tax authorities until recently, much of what is known
about motivations for tax compliance stems from economic and rational choice theories.
12

Based on this model, taxpayers are deterred from noncompliance and prompted toward
compliance when they fear detection from audits and criminal investigations and
punishment through prescribed financial penalties, liens, seizure of assets and federal
prosecution.
The deterrence principles of rational choice theory found support among early
investigations into tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Grasmick and Scott,
1982; Beck and Jung, 1989). However, more recent research has made clear that
techniques to improve tax compliance based solely on surveillance and sanctions can be
inadequate or counterproductive and do not explain voluntary compliance in the absence
of surveillance (Alm, 1991; Blumetal, Christian, and Slemrod, 1998; James and Nobes,
2000; Taylor, 200 1). Much of this research has relied on investigative tools such as
surveys of behavior, attitudes and intentions, analytical models, data from tax agencies
and experimental studies (Taylor, 200 1). Variables suggested to influence tax
compliance include civic and moral duty, trust in government, perception of tax fairness
and tax identity (Tyler, 1990; McGraw and Scholz, 199 1; Mason and Mason, 1992;
Roberts and Hite, 1994; Taylor, 2001).
Klepper and Nagin ( 1989) completed an extensive review of the survey research
conducted on the determinants of tax compliance. They report the following factors to be
significant: 1) perceptions of the probability of detection of noncompliance; 2) severity of
informal sanctions when individuals expected public revelation of detected
noncompliance; 3) moral beliefs about violating tax laws; 4) experience with other
noncompliers and past experience IRS enforcement (greater experience with both is
13

associated with greater noncompliance); and 5) demographics with older individuals
engaging in less noncompliance.
Drawing from the research literature and from theoretical work, Kidder and
McEwen (1989) suggest a typology of tax compliance and noncompliance and a range of
influencing factors. These include self-interest, habit, laziness, loyalty, social pressures,
procedural complexity and tax advisor influence. While not empirically derived, their
typology is helpful as a "heuristic device [that calls] attention to the rich complexity of
taxpaying behavior and the need for an ambitious research agenda" (Kidder and McEwen,
1989: 48).
Brooks and Doob (1990) sent surveys to 900 randomly selected persons in Canada
and received a response rate of 33 per cent. Using their survey results, they examined the
major premises underlying deterrence theory. They found that perception of likelihood
of apprehension for various forms of tax evasion is not related to whether or not a person
evades tax requirements and that tax evasion does not appear related to safe opportunity
to evade. By comparing the responses of evaders and compliers, they concluded that
deterrence is not a major explanation for tax compliance. They suggested that tax
decisions may not be made with the sort of careful thought and planning that had been
originally thought.
. I U.S. taxpayers who kept daily
Carroll (1992) collected information from 100

diaries of tax-related thoughts and behaviors and talked through their major tax
preparation work in the presence of a research assistant. He found that 60% of all tax
; . , different factors were
related statements centered around obtaining a refund and that
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significantly related to noncompliance by those participants misrepresenting income and
by those misrepresenting deductions. The former were related to lower income levels,
more opportunity for noncompliance, reliance on a tax professional, and fear of detection.
The latter were related to post season tax knowledge, reliance on a friend or relative as a
source of information in the prior year, receiving a better-than-expected refund and
unfairness of tax procedures.
Noble (2000) utilized interviews with owners and employees of small to medium
businesses in New Zealand to describe attitudes, perceptions, motivations and behaviors
linked to tax compliance and evasion. He identified two primary groups of tax evaders:
those who do pay tax and operate within the tax system and those who do not pay any tax
and operate outside the tax system. Within the former group, he identified five types of
taxpayers: non-evaders, opportunists, rebalancers, victims and calculating sharps. Non
evaders comply with tax law due to their long or short term goals of either making a
success of the business or enjoying the lifestyle of the business. Opportunists undertake
undeclared cash jobs for business needs such as those who see undeclared cash jobs as a
small perk or need undeclared cash income to make enough to survive. Rebalancers
over-claim expenses due to perceptions of being over taxed or to offset under-claiming in
other areas. Victims have been unable to pay tax owed because of external circumstances
such as bad debtors or their businesses no longer trading. Calculating sharps are extreme
evaders strongly focused on their financial success through evading their tax obligations.
For the group operating outside the tax system, he identified two types: those who
actively opt out of the tax system and those who passively opt out of the tax system.
15

Business owners who actively opt out of the tax system may include calculating sharps
who have been caught or victims who are unable to settle with tax authorities or go out of
business. Those who passively opt out of the system are typically business owners who
lack knowledge of their tax obligations. Furthermore, he found that as the amount of tax
evasion by firms increases, negative perceptions of tax authorities increases as well.
The Australian Tax Office identified a constellation of factors, known as BISEPS,
that presumably shape firms' capacity and inclination to comply with taxation
requirements (Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). This host of business, industry,
sociological, economic and psychological factors condition the ways typical firms
perceive and interact with tax and regulatory agencies and personnel. The use of BISEPS
enables the ATO to tap into industry specific information and target strategies to enhance
compliance.
Drawing from the ATO research, Shover, Job, and Carroll (2001: 7-8) describe
what has been learned about the Australian small building and construction industry:
Life in the small building and construction industry in Australia is filled
with uncertainties. The participants are a fairly casual lot who are
prepared to take risks but are also content to remain small businesses.
This an industry dominated by males with low literacy levels and variable
skill levels, many of whom come from non-English speaking backgrounds.
Distrust of government and fear of the ATO are common. Generally it is
considered okay to not pay tax, and peer pressure contributes to many
taking the risk of cheating. These are independent people who like to
manage their own show. Nearly half of these business owners are sole
traders, and nearly a third are in partnerships, commonly with their wife.
The overwhelming majority of them use the services of tax agents, but few
maintain on-going relationships throughout the year. The business records
are maintained by the wives. This industry is often faced with economic
uncertainty and pressures from competition, inflation, and interest rates,
and the weather. Business relationships are characterized by informality;
16

written contracts are eschewed and a great deal of advertising is by word
of mouth. Trade regulation is minimal and licensing requirements vary.
J •
Barter is common, as is the use of cash. The industry
norm is that weekend
work is paid for in cash that is not declared as income. The industry ethic
is very much one of looking after each other, and the high level of union
membership illustrates this. There is a strong belief in the "level playing
•· have an equal chance
field," meaning that everyone in the industry should
to make a living.
This research illustrates the existence of many possible motivations and
justifications underlying the nature of tax compliance and noncompliance. For some, the
tax system may be considered too complex and time consuming. Taxpayers are not
secure in their knowledge of the tax system or in the accuracy of their records and returns
(Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). On the basis of interviews with small building and
construction business owners in Australia, Shover, Job, and Carroll (2001) found that a
substantial proportion of respondents believe that little good and potentially a great deal
of trouble and lost production time can come from contacts with the ATO. A particularly
colorful representation was given by a plumber and his business partner:
I mean it's all too hard: that something that should be so simple is made
so hard. On top of going to work and making a living, we're expected to
work all our tax out and everything else out, and it's that bloody
complicated. Chartered accountants can't work it out who trained to do
that. And yet they want us to do it. I mean, like, how many of those guys
can come and put up gutters and dig trenches and lay plumbing? Fucking
none of them! But they expect us to be able to do--to keep our books in-
absolute perfect order (Shover, Job, and Carroll, 2001: 23).

..

There is further perception that tax enforcement is applied unfairly; insufficient
attention is paid to larger corporations while small businesses are harassed over small
sums (AICPA, 1983; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). Survey data from Yankelovich,
Skelly, and White (1984) show that a substantial majority of U.S. taxpayers believe, "the
17

present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the ordinary working man or woman."
An Australian small building and construction firm owner expressed an opinion of
unfairness about the taxation system:
[T]he thing that you'll find in the building industry is that they are
particularly hostile to the Taxation Department because they sit there and
they watch multinational companies paying no bloody tax at all [whilst]
they are being screwed into the ground. That's where the hostility comes
from. That's where a lot of cash economy comes from, because there . . .
is resentment . .. The rates are too high, [and] multinationalists will not
pay their taxes. And not only multinationals, there are others too. But
generally the wealthy don't pay their bloody taxes, and that's where the
resentment comes from (Shover, Job, and Carroll, 2001: 22).
This sentiment can be a strong incentive for small businesses to create their own tax
savings and ignore tax laws (AICPA, 1983).
Research also suggests the general public is extremely tolerant of cash
transactions by small business owners. Justifications include "everyone does it at some
time" and " it does not hurt anyone" (Bardach, 1989; Mason and Mason, 1992; Cash
Economy Task Force, 1998). Surveys conducted in Australia by the Cash Economy Task
Force (1998) reveal taxpayers are more tolerant of small businesses in the cash economy
cheating on their taxes than larger and more established businesses in the conventional
economy. Noble (2000) reports that the general public in New Zealand does not view
cash jobs as contributing to tax evasion; evasion was seen only as a problem in cases of
corporate avoidance or benefit fraud. Additionally, he noted that the public did not see an
advantage in curtailing the cash economy. Often times, consumers believe that they can
obtain lower prices through the cash economy and that the community as a whole would
not benefit from the extra taxes collected from cash businesses. Similarly, many perceive
18

of tax "cheating" as a victimless crime (Bardach, 1989; Mason and Mason, 1992). The
Cash Economy Task Force (1998) notes, "Most people who make donations to charities
feel positive about it. However, it appears that very few taxpayers send a cheque to the
ATO with same positive feeling."
Although the social science research into tax compliance tends to be in an early
stage of development, it suggests motivations in addition to self-interest and fear of
sanctions may be of considerable significance. Some of these motivations include civic
duty, moral beliefs, perceptions of tax fairness, tax complexity and time constraints. In
depth research is necessary to gain the insights that have been achieved in other areas of
compliance and that are necessary to inform policy makers.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
AND RESEARCH METHODS
The corpus of research into tax and regulatory compliance has neither a long
history nor the strong base of generally accepted factual knowledge to match what is
known about individuals and their noncompliance. The bulk of social science and
criminological research into compliance has focused on individuals and their behaviors.
The legacy of past research provides a substantially improved ability to explain, predict,
and control noncompliance by individuals and has influenced crime control strategies in
the criminal justice system. There is reason to believe that tax and regulatory
noncompliance may parallel its individual forms. Research into the criminal calculus
offers strong arguments for motivations other than utilitarian motivations (Cromwell,
2003). Similarly, research into the motivations for tax compliance suggests the notion of
individuals as "amoral calculators" may not be completely accurate. Currently, however,
we do not know for sure; the research is too limited to make the strong arguments
allowed in traditional criminological literature. As Wickerson (1995: 1 5) notes,
"compliance data needs to be supported by more qualitative data which can indicate the
general nature and causes of noncompliance. Tax administrators need such qualitative
data in order to determine how to best respond to noncompliance within particular
populations."
The current study uses qualitative interviews to explore the taxpaying behavior of
small business owners in a particular population, specifically the building and
construction industry. In this method of research, interviews are less structured than
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survey interviews; researchers ask open-ended questions and elicit specific responses but
participants are allowed and prompted to explain and clarify their responses (Babbie,
1998; Cromwell, 2003). It is a method that allows access to participants' knowledge,
experiences and opinions in their own words (Reinharz, 1992; Rubin and Rubin, 1995;
Johnson, 2002; Warren, 2002). The results of qualitative interviews offer "deep" or
"thick" descriptive information and understanding of the activity being studied (Johnson,
2002).
Understanding the meanings of participants' taxpaying actions are central to this
study because it allows the researcher to go beyond commonsense explanations (Babbie,
1998; Johnson, 2002; Cromwell, 2003). For instance, qualitative research into the
calculus of robbers and burglars, typically considered driven primarily by instrumental
motivations, reveals expressive motivations may be as much or a more salient
explanation (Flemming, 2003; Cromwell, 2003). Additionally, qualitative investigation
into gang violence, typically thought to be related to turf and conflict, reveals money and
drug dealing may be the more important driving factors (Padilla, 2003). Cromwell (2003:
xi) summarizes the significance of such findings: ''Thus, effective crime control
strategies must take into account the factors that drive crime. Field research that allows
offenders to 'speak for themselves' is ideally suited to these studies."
Research Questions

Three primary research questions guide the current research. First, what are the
different types of taxpaying behaviors for the business owners participating in the study?
More specifically, do they file annual tax statements, claim all income, keep records
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accurately and state deductions truthfully? Second, what factors shape, influence and
condition their taxpaying behavior? That is, what drives some owners of small building
and construction firms to comply with tax requirements while others do not? What
motivates these business owners to comply with some tax requirements but not other
requirements? Third, the study investigates the degree to which tax compliance parallels
compliance with other regulatory requirements? In other words, is compliance with tax
requirements an unitary or diverse phenomenon?

Sample
The small building and construction industry was selected as the focus of the
study for several reasons. First, smaller businesses have lower tax compliance rates than
larger, corporate businesses. The IRS-estimated voluntary compliance rate for small
businesses is approximately 79% as compared with 90% for corporations with assets of
$ 1 million or more (Internal Revenue Service, 1983). Second, the building and
construction industry is well recognized as a principal contributor to the informal
economy (Kagan, 1989; Sassen-Koob, 1989; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998;
Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhar, 2001). The IRS-estimated voluntary compliance
rate for builders is ranked among the lowest of classification codes, approximating that
less than 60 percent of income is reported (IRS, 1983). Finally, owners of small building
and construction firms are subject to numerous opportunities for cash income that may
not be reported to tax officials (Kagan, 1989). Based on surveys of consumers and their
expenditure patterns, the IRS (1983) found home repair and additions ranked among the
highest of household purchases from informal vendors by types of goods and service in
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1981.
The sample for the study consists of 25 owners of small building and construction
firms operating businesses in Knox County, Tennessee and contiguous counties. For
purposes of this study, small building and construction firms are those that employee or
subcontract no more than five persons at a time. ·The building and construction industry
comprises different occupational sectors such as carpentry, flooring, landscaping,
excavation, remodeling and general contracting.
The sample was obtained through snowball sampling. Initially, participants were
known personally and agreed to participate in the research project. They provided
referrals and contacts with other owners of small building and construction firms. Upon
completion of interviews, participants were asked to provide referrals and contacts with
other owners of small building and construction firms. Most participants were reluctant
to do such without first contacting potential referrals themselves. Upon gaining
permission from potential referrals, participants then gave the researcher a name and
phone number to contact. Several participants declined requests to furnish referrals or
contacts. Typically, they explained that they did not feel comfortable asking someone
else to participate in research related to taxation. A few participants who agreed to
provide referrals did not call back within a reasonable period of time. On these
occasions, they were contacted and asked about the progress of securing referrals. In each
of these cases, participants informed the researcher that the potential referrals had
declined to be contacted. Many times the owners of small building and construction
firms do not answer their calls but use an answering machine and messages were left for
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referrals. Some referrals never returned messages even after several attempts to reach
them. It was assumed they did not wish to participate in the study. Difficulties in
eliciting participants limited the sample size.
Several reasons for the problems experienced in obtaining participants were
noted. One reason is the personal and sensitive nature of taxpaying. Most persons
approached about participating in or providing referrals for the study expressed
apprehension about discussing taxation and personal finances. For instance, when asked
if they talked about taxpaying with other owners of small building and construction
businesses, most participants responded that they did not. One floorer stated, "you don't
'cause that's pretty much your own business. This stuff is really personal." A little later
in the same interview the participant was asked if he ever discussed taxpaying with other
people in general. The participant replied, "[I] did not really ever talk to them about it.
Like I said it's personal. " Another participant who admitted never filing a tax return
reported conversations about taxpaying were usually limited to talk about filing deadlines.
This participant revealed: "They say, 'You got your taxes in?' I say, 'Oh yeah. ' I don' t
even hesitate because I don't want anybody to know [that I don't file taxes]."
A second reason is that noncompliant persons do not want to risk being identified
by authorities (Brook and Doob, 1 990; Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 200 1 ).
Shover, Job, and Carroll (200 1) found that a substantial majority of small building and
construction firms identified through ATO files declined requests to be interviewed in
their study. The researchers were seeking to interview firms/owners who had varying
degrees of contact with the ATO in the preceding two years. The researchers estimated
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that not more than 5% of all firms contacted agreed to and completed an interview. Most
of these owners were tilted toward compliance with tax laws and had no particular reason
to be wary of sharing their experiences and opinions about the tax office. In the current
study, many participants were willing to participate only on the condition of
; I
confidentiality and several wanted reassurance
the study was not connected with the IRS.

Two participants allowed notes to be taken during the interview but refused to be tape
recorded conveying they did not want to risk being identified at some point. Both of
these participants admitted noncompliance with tax laws.
A third difficulty in soliciting participants for the study included the time
constraints owners of small building and construction firms experience. Most of the
participants do not have offices they work from and a majority of time is spent manually
working on job sites. Forty hour work weeks are considered light. Time after work is
usually devoted to paperwork, returning calls and completing responsibilities at home.
Interviews with participants and their spouses illustrate the problem:
PI: How many hours do you put in a week?
Subject (landscaper): About 40 hours during weekdays and then
Saturdays. It's physically draining.
PI: Does that count paperwork?
Spouse (who works with subject): No, that's just the physical work.
Paperwork is another monster in itself.
Subject: Yeah, I have already just put in about 3 hours today on it and will
probably work some more after this.
PI: Do the hours get to you?
Subject (general contract): It used to not. It does now.
Spouse (keeps books and works a fulltime job): You didn't have any kids
then.
Subject: You can say I have a mess out there right now and normally I
wouldn't keep it like that. Tools, trailers, materials, whatever else, from
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one end of the property to the other.
PI: What happens?
Subject: : Well, you got kids, I mean you can only pay daycare for so long
and realistically I could work seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day.

..

Spouse: You make sacrifices . . . if you're working all the time something
r •
else is going
to suffer and that' s either your work or your family. It's the
things. The lawn doesn't get mowed. It's those simple things . . . Then
I •
you have to put in that I work over 40 hours a week and you got two kids
and when you come home the last thing you want to sit down and talk
about is work. That is such a big effort nowadays especially when it's I
mean the business consumes so much of our time . . .
The sample size is smaller than was initially hoped due to these reasons as well as
time constraints to complete the study. Because the sample is small, nonrandom and
limited to a specific geographic region, the results of the study cannot be generalized to .
the building and construction industry as a whole. Limitations are discussed further in the
conclusion of the study.
Demographic Characteristics
Participants ranged in age from their late twenties to their mid-fifties and the
t I
and four females
average age was 36 years old. The sample included twenty-one males

and all were white. Fourteen participants were married, two were divorced and nine
were single. Four spouses who assist in business responsibiliti�s participated in
interviews. Fifteen were homeowners and the remaining ten rented their residences.
Twenty-two of the participants had a high school education and four had attended college.
Several participants had training through an apprenticeship or vocational program. Two
participants had college degrees.
The overwhelming majority of participants were raised in working class families
'

I
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and a few were from middle class backgrounds. Most of the participants' parents worked
blue collar type jobs while very few worked as professionals. More times than not, both
parents worked outside the home. None of the participants reported both parents being
unemployed.
Business Characteristics
As noted earlier, the small building and construction industry includes different
trades. Many participants contended that they were a "jack of all trades" but when asked
about a specialty most committed to one particular occupation in the building and
construction industry. Specialty areas included excavation, flooring/carpeting,
landscaping, painting, carpentry and glass and door. Several considered themselves
general contractors. Table 1 summarizes the types of businesses for participants in the
study.
An overwhelming majority of participants, specifically twenty-three, operated
their businesses from home and assumed bookkeeping responsibilities; for the married
participants, spouses were likely to take on bookkeeping tasks. Two participants ran their
business out of an office. Of the two, one kept his own records and the other used his
mother in the position of company bookkeeper. Few of the business owners in the study
employed regular, full time employees. The two participants working out of an office and
four participants working out of their home employed regular employees. The other
twenty-one participants typically used irregular and/or part time workers. Table 2
summarizes the number of employees/subcontractors by the businesses represented in the
sample.
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Table 1: Summary of Types of Businesses in Study

Business Types

n

Flooring and Carpeting

9

General Contractor

5

Landscaping

3

Carpentry

2

Excavation

2

Door and Glass Installation

1

Heavy Machine Operator

1

Vinyl Siding Installation

1

Architecture

1

Table 2: Summary of Number of Employees for Businesses in Study

Number of Employees

n

5 or less employees

3

4 or less employees

5

3 or less employees

6

2 or less employees

11
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Data Collection
Twenty-two interviews were conducted face-to-face and three by telephone.
Interviews were conducted at a time and place convenient for the participant. Seventeen
interviews took place in participants' homes and during evening hours. Three interviews
were held at job sites while participants were working and two were conducted at local
restaurants. While interviews varied in length, none lasted more than two hours. Most
averaged forty-five minutes.
. An interview guide was used to ensure uniform coverage of topics. Interviews
opened with questions about family background, marital history, education and training,
and work history. Participants were then asked questions about their business history
such as what type of business they operated, how they learned aspects of their business,
the length of time they had been in business, the types of customers they serviced, the
types of payments they received and the number and types of persons they employed.
The core of the interviews focused on specific bookkeeping and taxpaying behaviors and
the motivations driving such behaviors. Interviews concluded with inquiry into
reg�latory compliance. The interview questions were refined as necessary throughout the
research process. For example, initial inquiries into regulatory compliance centered
entirely around compliance with Occupational and Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) requirements. Many participants were unfamiliar with the guidelines or stated
that their work did not fall under OSHA requirements. Other regulatory requirements
such as fire codes, workman's compensation, licensing and permits were, however, often
discussed during interviews. Subsequently, other regulatory requirements were added
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during questioning. A copy of the final interview guide is provided in Appendix A.
Data Analysis

Twenty-three of the interviews were tape-recorded. Two participants requested
that their interviews not be tape-recorded but they gave permission for the researcher to
take notes during the interviews. Audio-taping was preferred to ensure a precise record
of questions and responses. Participants who agreed to audio-taping of their interviews
did so on the premise that anonymity and confidentiality be maintained. They were
assured that this would be the case and all participants who were interviewed face-to-face
signed an Informal Consent form to participate in the study. Those who were interviewed
by phone were read the Informed Consent form and agreed verbally with its provisions.
The Informed Consent Form is included in Appendix B.
Interviews were transcribed by the researcher. Keeping with the terms of
anonymity and confidentiality, all names of the participants and any names said during
the interview were omitted. Interviews were then analyzed using NUD*IST
(Nonnumerical Unstructured Data by Indexing, Searching and Theorizing) Vivo (Nvivo),
a computer program for analyzing text-based data (Richards, 1999). Nvivo allows the
researcher to code, recode and store ideas, concepts, categories and themes relevant to the
qualitative data being analyzed. Databases are created and can systematically be retrieved
and managed. Additionally, Nvivo offers the ability to maintain information about cases
by storing attributes. Information can be exported to create spreadsheets and databases.
This was especially useful for tracking demographic, business and compliance
characteristics and creating databases.
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.. developed. First, the study
During data analysis, a systematic coding strategy
examined two areas of government regulation for small building and construction firms:
taxation and regulatory rules. Categories specific to each were created. For taxation,
categories included filing a tax return, reporting income, reporting employee income and
claiming deductions. Categories for regulatory rules consisted of OSHA requirements,
building and fire codes, workman' s compensation, licensing and permits. Under each of
these categories, subcategories were created as necessary. For instance, under filing a tax
return, a subcategory included whether a tax statement was estimated quarterly or
annually or if a return was filed every year. Next, compliance levels were constructed
and subcategories were coded as appropriate. While there was considerable variation in
taxpaying behaviors and levels of compliance, at a broad level it was possible to
distinguish different types of behaviors and compliance levels. Last, statements
pertaining to behaviors and compliance were noted, highlighted rand coded as necessary.
.I l
The next three sections describes the findings of analysis.
The final section concludes

with a discussion of the limitations and theoretical and policy implications of the study.
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CHAPTER 4
TAXPAYING BEHAVIORS
Statistics from the IRS show that taxpayers who are subject to withholding report
and pay in a timely manner 97% of the taxes due on their income (Internal Revenue
Service, 1994). This is in contrast to a voluntary compliance rate of 78% for individuals
who are not subject to withholding (Internal Revenue Service, 1 994 ). Noble (2000)
suggests this variance in compliance rates may be explained by the different roles adopted
by these two groups of taxpayers. Noble (2000) distinguishes these roles as "passive"
and "active" respectively.
Regular wage earners or passive taxpayers typically give little thought to
taxpaying throughout the year. Taxes are considered inevitable; appropriate taxes are
withheld from each paycheck and submitted to tax authorities by the employer. Regular
wage earners do not have access to earnings withheld for taxes and base their personal
budgets on net income. When the time comes to file an annual tax statement, employers
provide a W-2 form summarizing total pay and the amount of taxes withheld for the year.
Wage earners file statements after the end of the year based on information from the W-2
form and on standard allowable deductions such as the number of dependents. Unless
wage earners itemize deductions beyond those allowed by the government, minimal
records are required. Often times, wage earners anticipate a refund and look forward to
filing their tax statement.
By contrast, small business owners are active taxpayers. They are charged with
collecting and paying taxes as they earn income and reporting monies paid to employees
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and/or subcontractors. In order to comply with tax requirements, they must at a bare
minimum have a system in place to record business income, expenses and payments to
others. From these records, they are responsible for estimating and paying taxes for
income on a quarterly basis. At the end of the year, they file a tax statement calculating
the actual amount of tax owed for the year based on reported income and allowable
itemized deductions. If taxes have been overestimated and paid quarterly, the owner is
entitled to a refund. If taxes have been underestimated, the balance must be paid by the
taxpaying deadline. Additionally, penalties are incurred if the owner fails to file and pay
an estimate of taxes on quarterly earnings when the taxes owed exceed $1000 for the
year. Penalties and interest are assessed for any taxes not paid by the annual filing
deadline. Owners are also required to withhold and submit payroll taxes for employees
and to report monies exceeding $600 that are paid to others performing services for the
business. The W-2 form is provided to employees and the 1099 form is provided to
subcontractors at the end of the year. The 1099 summarizes payments to each
independent contractor or subcontractor.
The relevance of the differing roles in taxpaying between regular wage earners
and owners of small businesses is found in the distribution of opportunities for tax
noncompliance. Shover and Wright (200 1 : 96) define opportunities as "arrangements or
situations that offer attractive potential for criminal reward, largely because they are
accompanied by little apparent risk of detection or penalty." For wage earners, the
reporting of income and withholding of taxes by employers decreases their opportunities
for noncompliance. That is, the risk of detection becomes more likely because
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noncompliance is more "visible" to authorities by virtue of the documents and
information submitted by employers (Kagan, 1989). By contrast, for small business
owners, a considerable amount of income may be "invisible" to authorities because of the
lack of documents and information from third parties (Kagan, 1989). In other words,
detection by authorities comes only with a greater amount of effort and resources that are
typically not available.
This chapter identifies five primary behaviors that the owners of small building
and construction firms in this study use in response to the increased opportunities for
noncompliance with taxpaying requirements: failing to file an annual tax statement;
failing to report all business income; maximizing deductions; falsifying business records;
and overpaying taxes. The specific behaviors are detailed separately along with the
frequency of each behavior and the profiles of the businesses and owners employing each
behavior. It is should be noted that the taxpaying behaviors are not fixed or mutually
exclusive and participants may fall into more than one category.
Failing to File an Annual Tax Statement
Failing to file an annual tax statement was the second most common taxpaying
behavior identified among the owners of small building and construction firms in the
study. Five of the participants admitted never filing taxes and one ceased filing for the
past two years. Three other participants reported previous periods of failing to file a tax
statement. Characteristic of owners in the study not filing annual tax returns was their
lack of personal responsibilities and commitments. None were married, had children,
owned a home, or maintained a line of credit while not filing a tax return. Most described
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a lifestyle considered less than conventional by society's standards with a penchant
toward "partying" and little concern for or obligation to anyone including tax authorities.
Back in the early days when I was making good money and spending good
money, you know on drugs and partying, I just didn't pay my taxes. I was
just having a good time.
Along with a lack of personal responsibilities, many spoke of enjoying freedom
from authority and a structured work situation.
I couldn't work for no one else. After awhile, I got so used to it,
everything I wanted to do [I did] the way I wanted.
I'll tell you what. One time, actually I went to work for [company name]
and I worked there for about two weeks on the second shift and I went in
one night and that's when Tennessee and Vanderbilt were the two best
basketball teams in the country and they were playing on TV that night and
I wanted to watch that game. And the more I thought about it, the more I
wanted to watch it. So I just went over there and clocked out and the
foreman told me, "What's the matter?" And I told him, "I am going home
to watch that ballgame." He said, "Well, you can' t do that. You do
something like that and I'll have to fire you." I said, "No you don't. I
quit." I went to the bar and watched the ballgame.
Typically, the dislike for structure transferred into their business style.
Participants failing to file tax statements kept poorly organized business records, if any at
all. For instance, during one interview on a job site, a participant wanted to show me the
invoice book used to keep records and had difficulty locating its whereabouts. Upon
finally locating the book, the participant found in it a previously misplaced $300 check
and stated, "I guess not many people lose checks like this."
Additionally, these participants were unable and not interested in expanding their
business. Usually they were restricted to accepting residential jobs that paid cash or
personal checks and work contracts in semi-rural to rural areas where work tends to be
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less formal. As one participant who had formerly not filed a tax statement conveyed:
You know there is a downside though. I mean you can only go so far if
you're going to have a reputation other than you do good work. But if
you 're working strictly cash these days, a lot of people aren' t going to
work you because they want to claim what they're having done.
While a substantial proportion of participants that had not filed annual tax
statements spoke of working mainly for cash income, they also, at times, accepted checks
from companies for contract and subcontract jobs and received 1099 forms from the
companies. All denied detection by tax authorities even though the pay was documented
and reported to the government. Several participants discussed that they had at some
point a fear of authorities catching up with them but resolving their trepidation as time
went on without consequence.
PI: When you talk about the fear of consequence, is it something that
hangs over you?
SUBJECT: It did the first three years that I got clean [from drug
addiction] .
PI: How have you gone about resolving that fear?
SUBJECT: Well, it just didn't bother me that much. You know one time
I moved to Georgia for about three months and worked and got a little
1 099 from somebody for about six grand and they [tax authorities] came
knocking on [former employer's] door looking for me in Georgia. But not
here. All these years. And I was gone and he told them I had moved to
Montana. They've never bothered me.
PI: But other contractors send in 1099's too?
SUBJECT: Yeah, they sent one for about $25,000 on me one year. Never
heard a word from them [IRS]. They don't do a very good job.
Several alluded that the "trick" was to remain anonymous with authorities by not
filing an annual tax return. One participant reported being told the same by an IRS
worker.
I had one cool IRS worker who told me the same thing they did
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[describing others who remained anonymous with tax authorities]. If you
just ignore them and you don't file anymore and you lose touch with them
then they just lose track of you. It seems the ones who do file and try to
work it out are the ones who have constant problems with them [the IRS].
Participants who became compliant after a period of noncompliance found this
last statement to be true.
I had gotten down about twenty-five thousand dollars [in back taxes].
When I finally got straightened back up and started doing the right thing,
living better, I just went in and set up payments with them and I paid
payments on it for three or four years . . . They did put some liens on
things. Two years ago, I went and borrowed twenty thousand dollars and
just paid it off . . . It was the liens and it was hard just trying to buy even
menial things. I mean it is on your record. You can't have anything. I tell
you gotta have credit and good credit to live alright . . . I mean they were
adding interest and penalties. They didn't care. It took me two or three
years to get straightened out but I paid my bills.
They write you a letter telling you they are going to start looking into your
assets. I mean, "We are going to start checking into your assets, boy!"
Basically, that's what it says . . . It's like I had an $8000 note from '93 and
it's got off after about six years. It was about $12,000. That's a pretty
good lick.
Ironically, though, while the owners who had never filed a tax statement were not
receiving official sanctions, their personal and business lifestyles were not without
consequence. They had little to show in the way of fruits of their labor as the years
progressed. As the oldest noncompliant participant reflected:
I worked all these years and never saved a penny but I had a good time
spending it. I had such a good time, that's why I'm now waiting on a liver
transplant.
Failini: to Report All Business Income

Failing to report business income on the tax statement was the most common
taxpaying behavior among owners of small building and construction firms in the study.
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Fourteen of the nineteen owners who filed tax returns admitted that they had to some
degree not reported income to tax authorities. The income varied in the types and
amounts that went unreported and was concealed through side jobs, side businesses and
cash payments.
Side Jobs
Side jobs refer to the work that owners take on outside their typical business
schedule. Three of the owners admitted taking side jobs for extra money. They
considered money earned from side jobs apart from regular business income.
Subject: When I do a little side job then people just usually give me
money.
PI: You said, "A side job." What do you consider a side job?
Subject: Well, it's when I don' t do it for a company but for an individual
who calls me and wants me to do something. If it's somebody you know.
I mean if they write me a personal check and don't ask for no social
security number then it's cash on the side.
For one owner, side jobs were used to barter for services from other businesses for
personal use. "Most of the time it is for trades and stuff. Like, I will trade with a guy for
some insulation work or things like that."
Typically, income from side jobs was viewed as spending money to be used for
enjoyment and recreation.
If you have cash in your pocket then you are going to spend it not
necessarily for equipment or maintenance or work costs . . . it's just for
extracurricular activities. You might want to go buy something you don't
normally have the money for, you know.
Side jobs were infrequent for most of the owners in the study because many
worked extended hours including nights and weekends just to maintain their businesses.
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Side Businesses
Side businesses differ from side jobs. The owners working side jobs did so as an
t"
extension of their business. The owners of side businesses
operated their businesses in
I

.

addition to being employed in the conventional economy. They reported high compliance
when paying tax on income from their conventional jobs but admitted not reporting the
income earned from their side businesses.
Three participants in the study operated side businesses. They shared several

•
characteristics.
They were not married, did not have children, and did not own their
home. It should be noted, however, that while they were single without families, they
alluded to many others operating side businesses who were married with families. One
owner worked at a professional job and conducted his side business at night and on
,. J
weekends. Two of the owners worked as
union laborers and operated their businesses

primarily when laid off and collecting unemployment r.
benefits.
For the owner who worked a full time professional job, the side business was
considered an entrepreneurial effort to be rewarded and capitalized upon.
.. . work. If I was in this full time, I
Employment' s different than doing some
would have to think about that [paying taxes] . . . doing the side work I
never see myself as part of the whole system . . . with the side stuff, I say
that money is mine.

For the other two owners, the side businesses were viewed as a lucrative
continuation of their union job.
[The company] puts the guys on unemployment for the wintertime. They
lay them off. We're a union company. So, I don't know if you've heard
this before, but once you get so many hours in for the year with the union
then your benefits are paid for the year. So if you work a thousand hours
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then your personal benefits are paid for one year. So if you only work six
months, you're still covered for the whole year. So around December or
January, they lay everyone off and if you have a side business then you can
get cash while you collect unemployment. And that's all cash money and
that's the same money you make normally before the taxes come out. So
you gotta love that.
The owners that operated side businesses appeared the most calculating of all
participants interviewed. They described well thought out schemes to avoid detection and
to ensure earnings were not taxed. For example:
Most [jobs] are at the lower end, like residential. The commercial is the
one you have concern with. I talk to the big jobs or the commercial like,
"How is that going to look on your books." I make sure to ask about that.
I say, "How do you guys put that on your books." I usually know the
person so I ask them to put it under [name] Enterprises in their book and
then make the check out to me personally. That way if they [tax
authorities] look at the books, I am nowhere to be found. It is just another
business gone. Now if they looked at the checks then that's another thing.
But they usually look at the books and that's not going to be of concern. If
it came down to it and they pulled checks, then something might happen . .
. I hold onto the paperwork for a couple of years in case it ever came back
up. And I overcharged the materials and kept the receipts but I returned a
lot of the stuff and I had paid cash to the workers I had so I could also
claim more on it. They couldn't track that way how much I really paid
out. If it came down to it, I could show them that I really didn't really
make that much off of it.
While owners of side businesses constituted a small proportion of the sample,
participants suggested many construction workers operate these types of businesses. As
one of these participants stated, "It's like a little network out there."
Cash Payments

Eleven owners in the study admitted that they had not stated cash payments from
regular business transactions on their income tax returns. Personal characteristics varied
among the eleven owners; they did not have specific attributes in common. For instance,
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., some had children.
they were married and divorced, homeowners and renters, and
Business characteristics also differed such as by trade and the number of employees.
While all admitted they had not reported cash payments on their tax statement, the
significant majority denied doing so regularly or for large amounts of income. The
largest amounts of cash not reported annually were estimated at 20% and 40% of total
earnings respectively by two owners. Other owners stated that the amounts they failed to
claim was a much smaller percentage of their earnings. Several respondents reported
limiting the amount of cash that they did not report.
I tried to keep as proper as can be on [cash jobs] most of the time. I mean
I tum in usually anything over $100. If it was under that or tips, I usually
don't keep up with it. You know the piddly things.
Many stated that cash jobs often were not available for the level of business they
were interested in conducting.

•

PI: Let me ask you, how do people usually pay you, checks or cash?
Subject: It's with checks. The ones you are going to make any money on
nine times out of ten . . . are going to pay you checks.
We are getting more jobs where people are paying us in checks. Like for
the past nine years, our jobs were usually with people that had money and
would just pay in cash. Now we are getting some advertising rather than
11 have more of a
just word of mouth referrals and those kind of folks
tendency to want to pay with a check so they can claim it back. You know
I' ve always found it unusual that people would pay us in cash and not have
any records of us being on the job.
Normally so I do take some cash jobs but I rarely claim them 'cause I
don't take that many. They're not traceable. It's usually the little jobs like
a $200 or $300 cash job. Anything above that is usually in check anyway.
Many admitted that cash transactions were attractive due to invisibility to tax
authorities. One owner summarized the point well:
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They can't prove nothing. I don't have no record of it. The people that
give it to me have no record of it. They got to prove that I done [the job]
and had [the cash] and spent it. It's hard to explain without paper to back
it up.
Despite the lucrativeness of cash payments, it appeared more important for these
owners to report the significant majority of their income for credit purposes and to avoid
detection.
Subject: It catches up with you in the future especially if you decide,
"Well, I think I will get married and have some kids."
Spouse: Especially when you want to get a mortgage. If you don't claim
your income, it kind of catches up with you. You have to show your tax
returns to get anything.
I figure the government can only come after me on what they can prove.
That would be the only way is by what I show through the bank and the
bills I spend like, you know, car payment, house payment, things like that.
That's real obvious as to how much money I made.
Maximizing Deductions
Maximizing deductions was another common taxpaying behavior found among
participants in the study. The behavior of maximizing deductions refers to claiming as
many business and personal expenses as possible in order to minimize the tax burden. By
maximizing deductions, business owners often push the limits of legitimacy. As one
participant stated, "I mean if I could get away with deducting the dog I would."
Eight of the participants in the study described maximizing deductions as a
taxpaying behavior. While participants who do not file a tax statement were
characterized by a lack of responsibility in their lifestyle and business style, the opposite
was found for participants maximizing deductions. Six were married and two had been
married and all owned their own home. Six of the eight had dependent children. As a
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group in comparison with other participants in the study, they tended to work more
regular hours, to accept more jobs for formal customers and businesses, maintain
organized business records, and use accountants to file their tax statements.
'(

Although similar in many characteristics, I identified two distinct groups of
owners that maximize deductions: professional and non-professional. Professional
owners of small building and construction firms had a place of business separate from
their home, a bookkeeper or elaborate bookkeeping system, and stable, full-time
employees. Additionally, they had their businesses set up as a corporations and more
aggressively sought tax relief through deductions. Non-professional owners operated
their business from their home, kept their own books or kept them with the assistance of a
spouse when married, did not typically keep regular/full-time employees, and filed their
business taxes as a sole proprietorship or as self-employed.
Professional Owners: Maximizing Deductions
Two participants were identified as professional business owners maximizing
deductions. Both of these participants operated their businesses from an office with
fulltime/regular employees who carried out the majority of labor tasks. The professional
owners typically worked 40 hour work weeks and focused on running the business. Both
reported investing the time and energy to become knowledgeable in ways to ensure
business and financial success.
. . . learning how to do it the first go around, I made terrible mistakes. I
,I in school, they never taught us
mean it was trial and error. I mean
anything about business. There were no business courses. I learned more
in high school general business than anything in college. I mean the first
go around, I was about twenty-five years old and really had no idea. [That]
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first year when I took everything in for the tax return and they said you
made this much money and you have to send this much money to the IRS,
I couldn't believe it. I didn't know anything. I mean money for taxes,
money for social security. I mean finding out things along that line. This
go around here, I shopped. I have a program that takes care of everything
all of the time. . . It used to be trial and error and now I know what I was
going into and prepared for it. So I stay up with everything everyday. . . I
have done quite a bit of research, done a number of things. I think a lot of
people get scared of learning to do new things or don't know how to begin.
I am always looking into different ways to do things, to make my business
operate better.
I was an idiot in the beginning being a sole proprietorship and not a
corporation and the way I paid taxes at first. I mean I paid like $22,000 a
year in taxes and it was unbelievable . . . I did that for five or six years. . .
Then I met a guy [accountant] at a concert . . . and he said, "You are a
fucking fool. You got to get incorporated. You are paying a fortune."
And I had been paying all that in taxes and let him do my taxes the next
year and I got $5000 back. I said, ". . . this the greatest thing I have ever
seen . . . " He carried me as an employee and he filed my taxes separate
from the corporation . . . I probably have saved hundreds of thousands for
myself in having the business as a corporation. Like five or six years of
self-employment taxes at twenty to thirty-eight thousand a year. We are
talking major that I have saved. . . It takes $100 to become a corporation. I
thought it was this long drawn out $5000 attorney deal. . . I really felt like
it was a big drawn out deal and so hard to do like it was going to be
expensive and so hard to do and all this worries about it. I didn' t know
anything about it.
Both of these owners had incorporated their business. By incorporating their
businesses, they shielded themselves from personal liabilities for the businesses' losses
and risks and capitalized on tax advantages. Corporations are taxed as an entity separate
from the individuals comprising them. The income of the business owner was paid by the
corporation and subject only to personal income tax.
I don't have to pay taxes for the business because I pay myself as an
employee and then just get a W-2 and file regularly . . . We have [business
income] where all of it accumulates and then at the end of the year we, the
holders, have a total sum that we can take or roll over to the next year.
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[The accountant] started carrying me as an employee and he filed my taxes
separate from the corporation . . . and the corporation was always broke at
tax time. I took corporate funds at the end and it was perfectly legal and
paid payroll taxes to myself on it you know and then I'd let the company
pay that . . I let the company pay my personal taxes too. I just have them
write another check and take it off for payroll the next year.
Both business owners reported comprehensive bookkeeping methods for tax
purposes; they recorded all business income, estimated and paid taxes in a timely manner,
reported all employee income and paid payroll taxes. Both used the services of an
accountant to advise them and prepare tax statements.
I have someone to do that for me. We take everything to her and she takes
care of filing everything. She seems to be able to show us the best way to
file things. Everything is legitimate but she just knows how to do it the
best for us. I mean there are things like even what type of car you should
drive to get the best break. We do everything by the books though.
This owner expressed resolution and confidence in the interview that he and the
accountant maximized deductions aggressively but did so legitimately. The other owner
was also forthcoming in reporting the importance of having an accountant that would
aggressively minimize tax costs. However, this owner was more tentative in contending
all behaviors were above board even though he claimed high tax compliance. Excerpts
from the interview describing experiences with accountants illustrate the point.
My dumb ass paid $18,000 last year from [accountant's name] because the
crazy woman put down everything I gave her. Whatever I gave her is what
she put down on paper and I wanted to make sure my mom [who is the
bookkeeper for the business] felt comfortable with the person we go to and
she never felt comfortable with [the former accountant]. She agrees he
was a good thing but she never liked his tactics . . . And so I got away
from him and went to [above-mentioned accountant] and she did the same
thing to us for a couple of years and I said I have got to change this. There
is no reason in the world why we should be paying taxes. Sure enough I
went to a new accountant and I told him I do not want to pay any taxes. I
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said I don't want to get any back, I just don't want to pay anything. And
he said, "We'll see what we can do . . . " She wasn't utilizing the whole tax
system. . . She wasn't counseling us and coming in and saying you can do
this different and you've done too much in this area. Like, "Why don't
you take a bonus for the next couple of months and let this balance out."
•- it up. Good accounting is
She didn't watch my books, she just added
crucial. It makes so much of a difference.
I have cheated a lot when I was with [first accountant] . Well, not really
cheating but his theory was take it and if there is any argument we can
fight it. So anything we were able to take even that would remotely relate
to us we would take it. He was smart enough even though a little
unconventional at times but superintelligent and he always had a plan and
took notes on everything we did so we could remember what was going on
. . . He goes to a lot of tax and IRS seminars. He is up that way and he
goes to DC and the IRS teaches everybody how to win everytime and he is
always there. He knows the IRS inside and out and he makes it his duty to
learn . . . He is just really into beating the IRS. Well, not really beating
them but just playing their game the way they tell him to play. We keep it
totally legal and keep explanations of why we did the way we do. I mean
it's the way they say it can be done and we do it.
Non-Professional Business Owners: Maximizing Deductions
Six participants were identified as non-professional owners maximizing
deductions. Their taxpaying behaviors differed in several ways from professional owners
maximizing deductions. Non-professional owners filed their tax statements as sole
proprietors or as self-employed. As sole proprietors, all income from their businesses
were filed on their personal tax statements in the year the income was earned and was
subject to both income and self-employment taxes. According to the participants, their
taxes constituted 25%-30% of their income. While all admitted not reporting some
income, they claimed that they reported the majority of the earnings and used deductions
to reduce their tax burden. As one owner summarized, "It just makes more business
sense to deposit [income] in the bank and pay your bills and take your deductions."
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Also unlike their professional counterparts, the non-professional owners were
limited in the time they could devote to developing business management and taxpaying
skills. They spent most of their time laboring on jobsites; business tasks often took a
backseat to the jobs at hand. Time constraints played a significant role in the way the
non-professional business owners went about utilizing the tax system to their benefit. For
instance, only one of the six participants completed payroll tasks and issued W-2 forms.
The other participants paid employees as independent subcontractors and submitted 1099
forms and they employed workers irregularly. These behaviors allowed the owners to
minimize paperwork but deduct worker's earnings. One owner and spouse described how
they go about this behavior.
Husband: I start them [employees] out at 6 [dollars] an hour and then if
they stay around I'd push them up to about 9 [dollars an hour] eventually
and then they were responsible for claiming it because it helps me out . . .
[to spouse] What is that she [accountant] calls it when you pay so many
people up to so much money and we don't have to send nothing on them?
Wife: Contract labor.
PI: How much can you claim on them?
Wife: You can go up to $900 per person for six people . . . We can claim
them without having to do the paperwork on them. That helps a lot.
I 'I

Another example of owners taking time constraints into account included the
decision to pay penalties rather than estimate taxes quarterly. Four of the six owners
failed to estimate their taxes quarterly. They reasoned that the penalty was minimal in
comparison with the time saved or that the penalty was offset by deductions.
Yeah, I just file at the end of the year and there is a penalty involved but it
is not that big of deal.
We should do it quarterly but we do it once a year. It just is easier to do it
once a year.
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PI: Do you pay quarterly or do you pay the penalty for once a year?
Spouse: Honestly, we've never really had to pay the penalty. Because the
child care thing . . . Because we file jointly on our taxes, what I pay in
covers a portion of his taxes. With all the deductions, you know once you
claim all the deductions.

''

.. by most of these participants.
The last quote represents a common impression
That is, if they do not have to send money at the end of the year regardless of what has
already been paid in taxes or penalties, such as in the case of taxes being withheld from
the spouse's payroll, then they are not paying taxes. Thus, reducing the bottom line on
their tax statements through deductions became an overreaching goal.
I keep every receipt and try to get every deduction I can . . . I go to dinner
and talk about business and keep the receipt. Every chance, I try to write
off.
You would be surprised. We keep every receipt you can imagine.. . . even
my cable because I got to watch the weather for my business
[landscaping].
• services of a tax accountant or
In finding ways to maximize deductions, the
preparer recurred as •a primary theme. Although the non-professional owners only visited
the "tax person" on a yearly basis, securing a "good accountant"
was no less important
.... 11
than for the professional owner.
Subject: A good accountant makes a big difference.
PI: So a good accountant makes a difference you think?
Subject: Well, it does . . . I mean he helps me take
.... care of everything legal
and like that but also to take what [deductions] I can.
Spouse: The accountant knows how to do it all.
Subject: She is creative.
Spouse: It is her specialty and she knows the ins and outs.
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Well we changed [accountants] . . . [previous accountant] was getting old
and not keeping up and [new accountant] seems to be up with things. I
mean the tax laws are always changing. [New accountant] seems to be
more thorough and asks more questions and seems to look for what we
could take and stuff. [New accountant] looks for the deductions. You
gotta have someone who hunts for things.
Searching for deductions was one of the most common characteristics owners
were looking for in a qualified accountant. Another characteristic was alerting owners to
"flags."
[Accountant] knows what we need to watch for. If she sees we have been
doing something, she tells us we need to stop doing that . . . Well, like she
tells us, "better not put that down because the IRS sees flags when things
change."
[Accountant] tells me when something red flags and I have to watch out because
[accountant] knows I'm not perfect and not always totally accurate . . . So we just
estimate and make it work out close to the last year.
It is interesting to note that while this last statement points to impropriety, the
owner considered himself to be a rather compliant taxpayer as did most of the owners
maximizing deductions. For the owners in the study, maximizing deductions was
perceived a good business behavior regardless of pushing the limits.
I mean the system will work for you. You buy equipment, you buy a
truck, your socks. You get to deduct everything from the socks down on
your feet. I do anyway. I mean it works for you if you work it.
Falsifying Business Records

Falsifying business records was a lesser common taxpaying behavior among
owners in the study. Falsifying records was typically used to compensate for
disorganization in bookkeeping or to minimize owed taxes. Five participants in the study
described falsifying business records as a primary behavior when preparing their tax
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statement.
In examining characteristics of these owners, most appeared to be attempting to
make ends meet in their business and personal lives. Four of the participants were
married and one was divorced. Four had children under the age of ten years and one had
no children. Three owned modest homes while the other two rented their places of
residence. Three spouses held part-time jobs and one also attended college part-time. The
spouses of the married owners assisted in the business to varying degrees and managed
business tasks. The business was often a source of stress in family life.
I mean the business consumes so much of our time . . . you know it's like
your marriage almost revolves around the business and you just cannot do
that when you're raising kids. And it's not good for us.
My computer' s bogged down because I can hardly use it now. It's so
overloaded right now. And that desk, there's not enough room for the
business and for our family and everything else. It's that growing thing.
It's getting so hard because [the kids], when he finally comes home, they
want his attention. We' re sitting here trying to go over what bills have
been paid, what he's written checks for today to pay out for materials, and
it's like, "What's that again," because everyone's talking and everyone' s
tired. I mean it's like the other night and we were working at midnight on
a big bill that we had to send to a guy that morning."
Spouse: We've been able to squeak by. When it gets bad, I call my
parents.
Owner: I mean this not a lifestyle for everybody. This is a very up and
down type of thing. I mean we are able to get ourselves through. I mean
when one of us is having a tough time then the other has to pick up the
slack and vice versa.
Spouse: I am considering going back to work because of the cash flow
problems. Just for the security. And so we can get health insurance which
we don't have. To me I find it very stressful.
References to financial difficulties were typical in interviews with participants
who were falsifying records.
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Spouse: We were going to file bankruptcy in December. We had gone to
Consumer Credit Counseling . . . and we just couldn't do it so we looked
t
at it and we looked and
what it entailed and he [subject] said n.
Subject: You know I just said no because I wasn't going to do it to my
wife and kids . . . being by myself, I could get out of it and say the hell
with it and start back over tomorrow. . . but it could destroy a marriage and
everything. It could destroy her.
We're making it stretch right now. You can get in trouble easy. Once you
start to get behind in your bills. Like we can easily pay $250 per month in
late fees alone if it's a bad month . . . If I can stay on top, I pay a little extra
on things but then when I have a bad time then it doesn't help to keep
ahead and you slide right back where you were.
Yeah, it takes a lot of fenagalling when you have projects. Got a lot of
income for materials and labor and they're late with partial or full payment
[for the job] then it makes it very tough to keep up. You have to make up
for the slack.
Additionally, the business was the primary source of income for the households
and many times separating money for the household and money for the business was
difficult.
Subject: If I went and did a job and a guy writes me a check for $2000,
well, I'm going to go down to the bank and cash that $2000 check and I'm
going to put it wherever. Well, I need $500 to pay this insurance. Well, it
don' t need to be like that. And what she's been saying is it don't need to
be like that. I don't like it. If I need money, if I need $ 100 to get fuel, I
just get $ 100 instead of taking money out for fuel. Like taking money for
us.
Spouse: He don't take a payday. We work off what we're making.
Everything goes in the pile. Whatever. We take everything out of the pile,
the bills, the groceries.

.

Descriptions of their taxpaying behaviors often paralleled their descriptions of
their financial problems and record keeping. Terminology such as "fenagling,"
"knocking out the bottom line" and "thinking creatively" were recurrent as participants
discussed dealing with tax records and finances. Following are some examples of the
51

behaviors that these owners and their spouses used to make ends meet in their taxpaying.
Spouse: So when it comes to filing our taxes I try everything I can to
knock out our bottom line--to not have to pay them so much at the end of
the year.
PI: So how do you knock it out?
Spouse: Well, I mean, a lot of it is legitimate. Where we pay and I
shouldn' t do this but . . . where he has paid people who help him on jobs
or you know when he split the money with another contractor, I don't ever
put that in as independent contractors or subcontractors. I run it under
materials. It doesn't mess the other person up and it saves me having to
work having to file all these 1099's. I don't have time to do it. So you try
to think creatively. Say we go buy tires. You know we are going to try to
make sure that's on something we are using for work.
Lots of times I try to get the customers to write multiple checks [to the
owner and employees]. . . most of our clients know we are trying to get the
best for them and not cheat them then they work with us. Like if they
don't mind then we try to get them to write checks out to all of us that
way.
. ' I just print out everything under
Spouse: [Relative] is our accountant and
the sun and let him have it. He knows how to operate without throwing up
the red flags. He tells me where I can put things that will fly and I just
defer things to wherever he thinks is best.
PI: I heard someone else call it "creative paperwork." Have ya' ll heard
that term?
Subject: We made it up.
Spouse: No. We do that but I have not heard it called that.

Subject: We will dump a lot of cash and expenses into inventory,
maintenance.
Spouse: Like [accountant] will play with the numbers . . . I don' t feel
good about not being honest but it's just unfortunately part of it. I just
don't know otherwise how we can do it.
PI: What do you do when [accountant] says there are red flags?
Subject: We just change it. We shift it around and just change it, you
know.
Throughout the interviews with owners and spouses who were falsifying records,
many were cognizant that their behaviors were illegitimate and most discussed having
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plans to change their situation.
Subject: We're on the verge of setting up an office. We're in the process.
I've got a trailer and I'm fixing to build a garage for my equipment. I'm
going to put it [the office] right beside the shop and she's going to go daily
at least a couple of hours of the morning or the night or whatever . . . The
business is picking up. I mean if it's going to be run right.
Spouse: It's time. It's no longer a hobby. It's become a job. And that's
how you have to start out.
So we need to shoot for incorporating . . . because if we go down it's not
just the business going down which is really what is happening it would be
everything. And that's not a lot of fun to think about.
I am trying to change jobs. I want completely out of the building business.
Pretty much I want to get a regular job. You know, working steady forty
to sixty hours a week . . . it's not nearly as much independence if I do that
though . . . but then I won't have to worry about getting the calls and
paying the bills.
Overpayine Taxes

Overpaying was the least common taxpaying behavior found among participants
in the study. Overpaying resulted from paying more tax than owed by reporting all
income and underclaiming deductions. Three participants in the study described
overpaying as their primary taxpaying behavior.
In common, the three (?Wners who overpaid taxes were married and had dependent
children in the home. Two of them owned their home and one rented. Spouses of all
three worked in the conventional economy; they were employed full time and received
regular paychecks and benefits from their employers. These owners espoused traditional
lifestyles for the most part by participating in school and recreational activities with their
children and for two attending church weekly. One owner discussed recovering from
alcoholism and being actively involved in a twelve step program. All three owners
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reported a strong work ethic and satisfaction in their work.
Two of the participants had been employed by large companies prior to entering
business for themselves. They described their business successfully developing from a
side business while laid off from previous employment.
When I got laid off the last time at [company], just gosh, probably word of
mouth got around church and then I ran an add in the paper, stuff like that
and it happened. Up until a year or so ago, I never turned a job down. Just
whatever somebody wanted done, if l couldn't do it, I' d find a way to get it
done.
I was laid off for about six months from [company]. I just couldn't sit
around so I started doing jobs for people and word got around . . . I began
making decent money . . . I liked being able to get a job done right . . .
When they called me back to work, we sat down and decided I could make
a go of this and I have.
The other participant learned the trade by working for another small business
owner and, upon discovering the profits that could be earned, branched out
independent! y.
Well, I tell you, when I worked with [name], [they] showed me one time
how much [they] were making and I was working for them at seven dollars
an hour. Well, I tell you what, I just really started paying attention and I
thought, "You know, I could do this on my own." It was true too. I mean
I have done real good for us doing this.
While all three owners spoke with pride about the financial rewards of their work,
it was just that--the rewards of their work. That is, none of the three owners displayed an
interest in gaining financial success through means other than their labor. Business tasks
were kept to a minimum. For example, all three described simply keeping records
through their checkbook. One owner described the bookkeeping process.
PI: How do you keep your books?
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Subject: Just do what has to be done. Whatever. You mean bookkeeping
as in?
PI: Like people pay you and then you have to record it and keep up with it
and your expenses and all that.
Subject: I just go through my checking account. Whatever people pay me
goes in my checking account and whatever I pay out comes out of my
checking account.
Pl: Do you keep a separate checking account or do you use your personal
checking account?
Subject: Keep it in the same one. I used to have two checking accounts
back when I was with [company] . [Wife] had one and I had one. It just
gets to be a hassle to keep up with tow and I would have a separate one for
business but one is always lost. So you need to write a check and, hey,
you got two checkbooks and one's lost and you just use the one you found.
So it's just easier to have one . . .
PI: How do you keep up with employee records? How do you pay people
that work for you?
Subject: Out of my personal checking account. I just write them a check.
I just try to keep everything as simple as I can because it can get too
complicated. In my checking account, I can just go down through there
and you know exactly what you made and got.
All three owners maintained that they deposited all income including cash in their
checking accounts and reported it on their tax statement. The same was not always true
for reporting deductions. They typically described keeping poor records of deductions
and estimating deductions usually to the benefit of the government.
I just estimate the best I can. I mean I probably cheat myself more than I
cheat them. I mean there are a lot of deductions I know I'm not giving
myself that I'm probably eligible for. Like a business portion of my home.
You know I have a room upstairs with a computer in it for the business. I
just get way behind . . . When you come in at night, you have the choice to
do your bookwork or do work around the house or spend time with the
family. You put the bookwork off . . . I mean it works okay.
None of the three owners were currently using an accountant to prepare their tax
statement. They had some previous experience in using an accountant but were not
interested in advice on minimizing their tax burden or in paying someone to simply fill
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out the forms.
I went to a tax lady once that someone told me about. I had everything
listed from the checkbook. She just wanted to complicate it and me to do
a bunch of stuff I wasn't wanting to keep up with. I just wanted the papers
filled out and I can do that myself for nothing.
Sometimes I took it to an accountant. Mostly, I took it to one and they
charged me. She said, "Oh, it makes it so easy when you have everything
listed here in order on a sheet of paper." All she had to do was transpose
off my sheet onto hers. It took her about fifteen minutes. She said, "It just
makes it so easy with everything listed here. And that will be $280 for
fifteen minutes." I thought, "Well, wait just a minute. Something is
wrong with this scenario." So the next year, I just got my form out and I
transferred it to over where she had them.
Like the owners who believed they were not paying taxes if they deducted enough
expenses and did not have to write a check at the end of the year, owners overpaying
taxes reported "not having to pay that much at the end of the year because their spouses
paid in." When questioned about the illusion presented, the owners expressed content
with their tax burden regardless of paying more tax than owed. A statement by one of the
participants summed up the general attitude of the three: "I don't really mind. If nobody
paid taxes, where would we be."
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CHAPTER S
MOTIVATIONAL DRIVERS
One of the most obvious conclusions drawn from the review of the tax
compliance literature is that we know little about the motivations driving taxpaying
behaviors. As noted previously, tax compliance research has centered almost exclusively
around economic benefit and potential loss through punishment as the primary motivation
for noncompliance. While social scientists have more recently begun to explore other
variables, an understanding of motivations other than self-interest remains limited. What
is clear, however, is that one motivation does not stand alone among the others and that
the motivations underlying taxpaying are complex and dynamic dimensions of human
behavior.
The second objective of this study was to explore the motivations driving the
taxpaying behaviors of the participating owners of small building and construction firms.
In order to achieve the objective, participants were asked specifically about their
motivations for compliant and noncompliant behaviors. Many times, motivations became
apparent through discussions of taxpaying behaviors. Five primary motivational drivers
were identified in the study: fearing legal consequences; developing/maintaining social
capital; obtaining business and taxpaying skills; perceiving the tax system as fair or
unfair; and compensating for long hours and a lack of benefits.
Fearing Legal Consequences

The fear of legal consequences operated in several ways to effect compliance and
noncompliance among owners of small building and construction firms in the study. It
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was reported by all participants engaged in the tax system as a primary motivation for
filing an annual tax statement and for reporting the majority of income on the tax
statement.
PI: What motivates you to pay taxes?
Subject: Afraid not to.
PI: What makes you afraid?
Subject: I don' t know. I just do it. I mean, what difference does it make
whether you agree with it or you don't agree with it. You gotta do it
whether you want to or not.
taxes?

PI: What is the main motivation or thing that motivates you to claim money for
Subject: The fear of getting in trouble. The fines. Having to pay them
unexpected fees and fines. Them going back and coming with money you
might owe them.
While none of the participants referred to the possibility of prosecution or

imprisonment as a potential consequence they feared, many talked about their fears of tax
authorities assessing penalties, liens and seizure of assets if noncompliance was detected.
The government can come in and take what they want and they pretty
much audit you and I don't want to be stuck with a bill that's you know
like them saying, "You cheated us for fifty thousand dollars and we want it
now." I don't like to owe nobody nothing.
They can threaten to garnish your money or seize your property. I mean I
have heard of people they have that shit happen to them . . . I mean they'll
take your house and stuff and garnish your money and hit your bank
accounts . . . They get you in and they're the government and you can't do
anything about it. I mean you don't have any recourse with them.
The government can come in and take what they want and they pretty
much audit you and I don't want to be stuck with a bill that's, you know,
like them saying, "You cheated us for fifty thousand dollars and we want it
now." I don't like owing nobody nothing.
While the threat of formal consequences steered these participants toward
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compliance with filing a tax statement and claiming income, this fear also motivated
many, especially those who had experienced sanctions, to seek out ways to minimize their
tax burden. Nine owners had at some time experienced sanctions from tax authorities in
the forms of penalties, interest and liens. Many of these owners considered themselves
fundamentally compliant and believed they were penalized for what they considered
errors and/or minor improprieties. The imposition of sanctions often served to embitter
them toward seeking personal remedy by maximizing deductions.
I'm not real crazy about Uncle Sam. I mean he can kiss my ass. But
because of the amount of money we have had to pay, we had to borrow
fifty thousand dollars because we got so behind on our taxes so I'm not
real crazy about the whole tax thing. So every chance I can I try to get a
write-off. I thinks it's so bad . . . all those penalties and interest and we
had to pay a lot of money.
One participant disengaged from the tax system altogether due to mounting
penalties and interest after years of trying to comply.
The penalty . . . and the interest is figured in automatically and the interest
keeps building. The way they have it set up you just get in deep 'til you
can't get out . . .They set you up on this payment schedule and you can pay
it just like you do your other bills but then it just gets bigger and bigger
with the interest and you never can get caught up. They just let you get
screwed and they don't give a shit . . . I just gave up on them [stopped
filing a tax statement]. I don't have anything for them to take really right
now . . . but I think they have lost track right now.
Similarly, for participants who failed to file an annual tax statement, a fear of
consequences often kept them disengaged from the tax system.
PI: What is the main reason you never paid [taxes]?
Subject: Well, you know, after I got out of the service in '68, I pretty well
spent several years where all I did was party. And then you know and I
kinda slowed down a little bit and thought, "Well, I better file and pay
these taxes but then no if I do that then they'll catch me for these past
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years." So I just never did.
PI: Have you given any thought to eventually beginning to pay your
taxes?
Subject: Yeah, sometimes I have but every time I think about it I think
about how I' m going to explain all this time that I' ve not paid anything
and what they' ll do. So I just keep rolling along the way it is.
Others who had not filed a tax statement reported that they did not have a fear of
consequences.
I really don't worry about it. I mean I don't think . . . Hell, they won't put
you in jail. They' ll set up payments for you if you volunteer to pay.
You'll just be. It' s just not that scary or hard. My dad' s been through it.
They put him up for fifteen thousand dollars and he set up payments and
sent them a couple of thousand here and there. You know set up
payments. I mean they want their money. They don't want to spend
money to have lawyers and go to court.

Developinl:{Maintaining Social and Business Capital
In the past decade, one of the most important contributions to criminological
theory and research has been the introduction of Sampson and Laub' s (1993) age-graded
theory of crime desistance. Their research suggests that building "social capital" reduces
the likelihood of continued deviance by individuals. The term social capital was
introduced by Coleman (1988) and refers to the development of positive relationships
with individuals and institutions that are life-enhancing such as marriage and stable
employment. According to Sampson and Laub (1993), building social capital supports
conventional behavior in the same way that building financial capital improves the
chance for personal success.
Developing and maintaining social capital has not been examined as a factor in
tax compliance research. Demographic characteristics and interviews from the current
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study, however, suggest that developing and maintaining social capital played an
important role in driving tax compliance among the majority of the participants.
Demographic characteristics varied between the most and least compliant participants in
the study. Participants indicating higher levels of compliance with taxpaying tended to
lead traditional lifestyles and operate more established and organized businesses. They
were typically married or had been married, had children and owned their home. Their
businesses allowed them a satisfaction that they were not willing to risk with tax troubles.

,, . is not too bad.
We usually really make about $50,000 a year. I mean that
We have a good home and do okay. I mean, we have things we never
would have dreamed of having when we were younger.
I want to make money to put my daughter through a private school and
give her the best. That is my main concern. I just want a decent life. I am
not greedy. If I can be fed, take care of my daughter, have good friends
and be happy then I am a blessed man.
Alternatively, owners who failed to file a tax statement tended to be single
without children, lacked home ownership and a line of credit and led less than
conventional lifestyles. Additionally, their businesses appeared unorganized and poorly
structured. The three participants who began filing tax statements and became
increasingly tax compliant after years of complete tax noncompliance described
developing a more conventional lifestyle as significant in their transition. For one owner,
getting married and establishing a home and family motivated compliance.
Subject: When I met my wife, I wasn't doing, let me take that back, I
really didn't have to do it [filing a tax statement]. I was single. I didn't
make an effort to do it, you know. I think that happens to a lot of single
people . . . The first year, I had a problem with it [coming into compliance].
Spouse: Yeah, you showed you earned sixteen hundred dollars. I said,
"Like excuse me. I don't think so. I know you earned more money than
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that."
Subject: Responsibility makes it. Growing up and responsibility. Put it
that way.
Spouse: Deciding what's important, what you want.
PI: Do you have to comply with things to get to that point?
Spouse: I' m sure there are people out there that say no but I wasn' t raised
that way. I think there are probably people who think you can have things
in life and not have to comply but I think those things catch up with you. I
don't want to take that risk.
Subject: Yeah, they will catch up with you. I was like that until I met
[spouse] . I mean really I still feel that way but you know I have to do what
she says. If I could get my way, I would.
(Later in the interview.)
PI: So [subject] , what motivates you to pay taxes?
Subject: My wife.
Spouse: He likes to be able to take a loan and buy a piece of equipment
and he likes to have a truck. You have to be able to borrow money and
you can't borrow money if you don't have anything to show for it, for
what you've earned.
For the other two participants who had changed the trajectory of their taxpaying
history, the decision to desist in a "partying" lifestyle led to their decision to become tax
compliant.
I filed one year and then I didn't file nothing until '9 1 . So that was from
'79 until '9 1 . Nothing. And then when I got clean, (describing the ninth
step process of Narcotics Anonymous) I wrote the IRS a letter and said,
"Look, I'm a drug addict and if I owe you any money, I want to know.
You know, I want to get straight with you." I didn't go into large detail.
When I finally got straightened back up [from cocaine] and started doing
the right thing, living better, I just went in and set up a payment with them
and I paid a lot for three or four years.
Owners in the study who were currently not filing tax statements also talked about
the effects of their lifestyle on their lack of compliance. Apparent was the lack of
accountability to others.
The only person I ever have to answer to is the customer and I do good
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work for a good price. I set my own hours in getting a job done and even
then I can make changes if I want . . . I can go out and party and have a
good time when I want . . . I stay my own person.
For the most noncompliant owners, life changes may at some time sway their
taxpaying behavior toward a more compliant bend. One of the most noncompliant
owners in the study is planning to marry soon and discussed thoughts along this line.
Subject: I think I am going to file this year?
PI: What has made you thin you are going to this year?
Subject: I'm getting married and we're buying stuff and even if we
weren't buying stuff, [fiance] just you know inspired me. . . Until I got
engaged, I just never really had to worry about it. It has been kind of hard
too. [Fiance] shows about $55,000 a year and I show nothing. I am more
of a liability.
Obtaining Business and Taxpyaing Skills

As described earlier, by becoming a business owner participants assumed
additional tax and business responsibilities that were not present when they were
employed by others. All of the participants described being unprepared to assume the
organizational, business management and tax responsibilities required of a business
owner. As one participant aptly noted, "I drive nails. I don't do books." Most owners in
the study described learning the necessary business skills through trial and error.
Trial and error are a big part of it and a lot of errors are made. You j ust
get back up and try again. You learn from it.
You know I was young into it. I didn't know. You know, I guess if I got
audited now, I'll just say [that] I thought I was doing the right thing. And
that's the truth. And if l learn otherwise then I'll correct it and use it so I
don't have to go through it again and hopefully the penalty will not be bad.
PI: [Spouse], you do most of the books. How did you learn to do it?
Subject: That first year, she didn't know what she was doing. She was
trying to screw me over.
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Spouse: I did not. The first year we did it, I remember I had a room. We
filed an extension and it was the day we were suppose to go see our tax
person. I still had a room full of receipts I was looking through. When I
say a room, I mean it was my upstairs vacated bedroom that was supposed
to be my office but really looked like my junk pit. And it was strewn with
receipts. Going through all of them and just trying to organize it to the
extent of here's what we spent on materials, here is oh yeah, we can use
this. Here is a gas receipt. You know the first year was a live and let learn
kind of thing.
The learning process appeared to be the same for owners of the smallest
businesses and the owners of the larger incorporated businesses participating in the study.
The primary difference between the professional owners and the nonprofessional owners
in the study seemed to center around the resources, time and energy, and capacity to
develop the necessary business skills. Several nonprofessional owners related that they
were unable to handle business growth due to these deficits.
We have had a lot of people working here and a lot of huge jobs constantly
but it was unmanageable. It's hard to keep quality of work up. To be
compliant, you have to be bigger and settle for less quality . . . I was just
trying to maintain things . . . We finally fired everyone and just did it
ourselves for a little while.
Basically what I did was, see I took a couple of losses last year. I had too
many jobs going on at one time. Took a couple of losses. [I] ad a couple
of customers that bitched, whined and griped, wasn't going to pay. So I
went back to "it's a dog eat world out there" . . . It's a learning process.
Well, actually the first couple of years I made a lot of money but then I
started assuming debt after a couple of years and then this year I'm finally
getting myself straight. Realistically, the best way to do is, you know, [is]
to stay small or get big and don't get in between. And I'm in between . . .
If you're real small like I said, you can make a real good living at it . . .
You can live like pretty much like everyone else. But this fourth year, I'm
beaten down to death.
As mentioned earlier, nine owners had experienced past IRS sanctions and many
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of these owners attributed their noncompliance to errors made because of disorganization,
uneducated bookkeeping methods and a lack of knowledge. Two owners who never filed
a tax statement attributed a part of their noncompliance to a lack of the skills necessary to
operate a business.
This will be the first year that I'm trying to do the books, keeping all my
receipts and about once every month or so I dig them out of this console
thing [in the work van] . It' s really horrible. I dig them out and put them
in this folder all crumpled up with cappuccino stains . . . the ADD
(Attention Deficit Disorder) just wouldn't allow me to it or organize
enough . . . Just poor organization.
Well, that [bookkeeping] is just something I never learned. I don't do
none of that kind of stuff . . . I just work for a living.
Perceiving the Tax System as Fair or Unfair

The perception of fairness, or more accurately the unfairness, of the tax system
was an issue in the majority of the interviews with participants who filed annual tax
statements. Most complained that the percentage of taxes owed as self-employed/sole
proprietors was inflated. The owners claimed consistently that taxes "took" a minimum
of 25% and a maximum of 35% of their business income. For many of the owners who
failed to report cash income, maximized deductions and falsified records, perceiving the
tax system as unfair served as a justification for their noncompliance.
I mean it' s hard to justify at the end of the month or the end of three
months. This what we made so now let' s take 25-30% and send it to the
IRS?
PI: When you get cash, do you claim it on your taxes?
Spouse: Not hardly. It' s unbelievable what you have to take out of it if
you do.
PI: Unbelievable? How much is it?
Subject: It's 33% or 34% . . . It' s crazy. I mean we have to pay 30% plus
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on what we make plus social security plus medicare. I mean they hit you
for it. We used to get four or five thousand dollars back when he worked a
regular job.
PI: What about when you get a cash job and you don't claim it, what
motivates you not to claim the money?
Subject: Probably because having to pay so much taxes is the main
reason. It would be having to pay so much in taxes . I mean we are paying
' ' going to go to them
so much already that I mean the money is probably
anyway so why give them more.
The last quote demonstrates a related justification given by several of these
participants: the income tax system is not the only tax that is unfair but the tax system in
general is unfair. For instance, one owner explained, "Like I pay taxes for public school
even though my daughter goes to a private school. You know I don 't think that' s right. It
(not claiming all income and maximizing deductions) all just works out." Several
participants talked at length about their thoughts about taxes in general in order to justify
their noncompliance. The thoughts of one business owner particularly represents the
typical argument.
See you're talking about taxes. You bought your car new. You paid taxes
on that car. When you sell that car why should that person, for instance,
you sell your car tomorrow to [spouse] . Why should she have to tum
around and pay tax on that car again. You see. That' s one example. Just
like my trucks for example. How many times I buy used stuff. How many
times are you going to have to pay taxes? Everytime you sell it. But why?
That's what I don't understand. If I have a truck out here and I'm the fifth
,I
... tax. I've got a truck
owner of that truck. Well, I paid
right now I have to
go down there and register. I'm going to have to pay tax on that and ain't
no telling how many people has done that. I don't understand why you
have to do that. Vehicles is one of the most things being taxed. You
should pay taxes the one time you buy it and that should be it in my
opinion. But that's not how it works.

..

.. portion of the interviews discussing the
While many of the owners spent some
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unfairness of the tax system, the owners who were overpaying their taxes believed the tax
system was fair. Their perceptions of tax fairness served to justify their compliance.
They [other owners] don't appreciate what we have as much as some do.
People that pay all of their taxes appreciate the way we live in this country
more than those that hide money from taxes. You know not being bossed
around by Taliban, stuff like that. You know I appreciate that.
Compensating for Long Hours and a Lack of Benefits
Similar to participants' dissatisfaction with the tax system was their discontent
with the long hours and the lack of benefits associated with being small business owners.
Many of the owners were frustrated by the long hours they worked without vacations and
by the high costs of personal and family medical insurance, liability insurance and
workman's compensation.
Not many people do that [keep money back for owed taxes] because of
cash flow problems. You have that money and you need to pay bills or
something comes up or you need something for the job and you have to
use the money. By the time everything comes out, you don't make that
much anyway. Like on about $50,000 after a contractor take their 18%
and then the 12% for workman's comp and then more for liability and then
if I keep taxes out, I end up with about $ 18,000. And I don' t have any
benefits.
People say, "Boy, you made that much money today." They don't know
what comes out that today. What I pay in taxes, what I pay in insurance.
Don' t get me wrong, I mean as long as I can work and [spouse] can stay
home raising these kids, that's what I agreed to do when we got married.
But it's hard, you know what I'm saying. When you have to take your
health insurance. Everything I make, everything comes out of it.
Like for instance, health care. You get like us. We don't have healthcare.
And I tried to get the kids on Tenn Care like twice even temporarily. As
someone who pays taxes and spends a lot of damn money in a year's time,
it kinda pisses me off. I see people bailing out. Like my family members,
crack addicts that get several thousand dollars a month and the
government and every damn thing else and it makes me mad.
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The unrest of these owners led them to compensate for their perceived losses by

.

underclaiming income and maximizing deductions.
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CHAPTER 6
TAX COMPLIANCE:
. I
UNITARY OR DIVERSE
PHENOMENON
The bulk of the paper, thus far, has centered around compliance with tax
requirements. The last research objective introduces compliance with other regulatory
requirements into the study. Specifically, the study examined the degree to which tax
compliance paralleled regulatory compliance for the owners of small building and
construction firms participating in the study. Research has shown that there appears to be
very little offense specialization for the vast majority of street offenders (Petersila, et. al.,
1978; Peterson and Baker, 1980; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982). Whether noncompliance
is confined to one of area of regulation or shows a pattern of dispersal across multiple
areas and regulatory programs is an unexplored area of research into tax and regulatory
compliance.
In order to explore whether tax compliance was a unitary or diverse phenomenon
among the participants, I inquired into their compliance with regulatory requirements at
the close of interviews. As discussed earlier, it was initially planned to examine their
compliance exclusively with OSHA standards. Early into the study, though, it was
learned that not all of the participants fell under OSHA requirements but that all
participants were required to abide by some type of regulatory requirement. The type of
standards participants were required to follow often depended on the type and size of
jobs. To compensate for the differences in regulatory standards among participants,
compliance with regulatory requirements was generally examined. In other words, rather
than looking for compliance levels with a specific requirement, determining participants'
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overall compliance level with regulatory requirements became the objective.
Comparisons of tax compliance and regulatory compliance were made by grouping
participants by the taxpaying behavior they most often practiced. The results are
presented in this manner.
Failing to File an Annual Tax Statement

Six participants admitted that they did not file an annual tax statement; they were
completely noncompliant with tax requirements. All of these participants also admitted
that they did not follow any regulatory requirements. Additionally, they did not carry
liability insurance or workman's compensation insurance unless forced by a contractor as
a condition of a particular job. In these cases, the contractor carried the insurance and
subtracted the cost from the payment for the job. One of the owners confided that they
did not usually even carry auto insurance on their work vehicles. One participant
described a government job that the owner and crew walked off because of regulatory
requirements.
We walked off a job one time. Like it was a government apartment
building that the government financed. They had, we had, we done half of
them and all of a sudden they came in and "you have to wear steel-toed
shoes and hard hats." I mean that's just not something you could do
easily. Like with steel-toed boots, your feet didn't bend and you're
wearing a hard hat and the thing would fly off against the wall or
something . . . we just went and told them we weren't doing that and we
left.
This description was not typical among these noncompliant owners. Usually they
worked residential jobs and avoided work that would put them in contact with authorities.
As one owner stated, "I don't take the big jobs that make you do all that stuff. . . I don't
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need no one telling how I need to do things."
Failing to Report Income-Side Businesses
Three owners operated side businesses and failed to report any income from their
businesses. These three owners also reported that they typically did not follow any
regulatory guidelines. This group of owners described scheming to avoid detection by
regulatory authorities just as they had described efforts to avoid paying taxes on income
earned from their businesses. While they were adamant in contending that they followed
"common sense" safety standards, they made no effort to hide that their primary motive
was to tum in low bids and make a profit.
Most of the homeowners feel it is their home and no one's business what
they are doing to their home. They don't want to hassle with all that stuff.
You know also they don't want to know about all of those requirements.
If you tell them they are going to have to have permits and inspections and
all that stuff they are going find someone else who isn't going to make
them hassle with it. . . It's just common sense on what you have to do to
stay safe and do it right. I mean you know what you're doing. You aren' t
going to do stupid things. You know what's smart to do. Okay, you do
things because how it is done because of someone putting it in a book.
We won't win jobs on a bid if you comply with OSHA one hundred
percent. Then you won't get any jobs. . . It's just too much money and
safety. . . [if you comply] they'll get the next person. . . I mean you would
lose a lot of work if you gave prices according to OSHA regulations.
While profit was a primary motive, the owners of side businesses also wanted to
maintain the anonymity of their businesses. As one stated, "You don' t want to get tied up
in the system. That's why I keep it on the side."
Maximizing Deductions-Professional
Two participants were identified as professional business owners who maximized
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deductions. They reported being highly compliant with tax requirements operating within
the system to minimize their tax burden. They also reported high compliance with
regulatory requirements.
You know we are required by law and I have to keep up with that to
maintain the business. So I mean the state required it be done by the
requirements and that' s what we do and people know that or in my
business you don't work. I mean we are held by standards and contractors
know that. You can't do business if you don't.
I keep up with everything. The fire marshal is probably the biggest thing I
have to keep up with. They come by every two to three months and walk
around and look at the place and make recommendations or write you up
and check. I keep up with it. . . Everything is by the book. It's not worth
hurting people. You know it's there to protect people so we try to stay
good so there is no reason to try to beat the system. . . Some people may
say fuck it and not do it totally by the book but I do it all by the book.
Interestingly, though, the last quote came from the same owner who reported high
tax compliance while alluding to possible improprieties in completing tax requirements.
The same was found while this participant discussed compliance with regulatory
requirements. The above quote followed the next quote describing noncompliance with
standards.
Everytime you work on one of those doors, you have to bring it back into
your UL listed shop that has been inspected and work on it there. You
can't work on it out in the field. . . That is good for us because we can
charge for four hours instead of one. You know it is good for us but it is a
pain in the ass sometimes. Now, sometimes we do run it around the side
of the building and cut it at the truck and bring it back in and say we didn't
get that much traffic.
The participant was asked about the inconsistencies in his philosophies and
actions.
PI: What about when you take a door around the side and cut it, how do
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you account for that?
Subject: It just saves the hassle fo bringing it in. It doesn't compromise
safety. We only do that on little jobs and know what the regulations are
for it so it is really by the book. . . Just time-saving not safety or
requirements.
While it was important to take this participant's word with a grain of the
proverbial salt, he was at least consistent.
Maximizine Deductions-Non-Professional

Six non-professional business owners in the study maximized deductions as their
primary taxpaying behavior. Results in comparing their levels of tax and regulatory
compliance were varied. Two of these participants considered themselves as highly
compliant in both tax and regulatory compliance. For the others, their tax and regulatory
compliance did not parallel each other.
Falsifyine Records

Falsifying records was the primary taxpaying behavior for five of the small
business owners participating in the study. These owners admitted shifting expenses on
their tax return to their benefit and they did not always claim cash income. They all
identified themselves as moderately compliant with tax requirements. As for regulatory
requirements, they claimed to be moderately compliant (N=3) or highly compliant (N=2).
The participants who were moderately compliant in both arenas appeared to focus on the
day to day operation of their businesses with little foresight; they were just trying to make
ends meet in the present.
I'm about 70% [compliant with regulatory requirements]. I mean I try to.
I mean there are some things just like going down the road with a machine
chained down. They require two chains. I don't put two chains down. . .
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unless I'm going to Knoxville. But if I'm just going down the road, I
won't even chain one [piece of heavy equipment] . . . I j ust got an $800
fine for using another person's equipment whose wasn't up to par. I just
had that feeling I' d end up getting caught. Well, I did. I didn't know not
even his headlights would work on his truck.
The two owners who were moderately compliant in their tax requirements but
highly compliant with regulatory standards appeared to place a premium on safety. Their
commitment to safety appeared to be the catalyst driving their higher level of compliance
with regulations.
Subject: I checked into things when I first started and we are more than
sufficient. This doesn 't matter whether they have standards or not, it's just
the way I do business. Safety is the main thing.
Spouse: We are all over it.
Subject: I mean we even watch each other. They [employees] remind us
even if we forget to put on our glasses. We are all in this together. We
live the safety things.
Overpaying

Three owners reported claiming all income and understating deductions on their
annual tax statements leading them to overcomply with their tax obligations.
Summarizing from earlier, they were concerned primarily with the labor tasks at hand and
with keeping business matters simple. Their simplicity in taxpaying paralleled their
attitude toward regulatory requirements. This same attitude, however, led to
noncompliance with regulatory requirements.
PI: Are you under any regulatory guidelines, like OSHA requirements?
Subject: Probably but I don't know who they are.
PI: They would be like the safety people who may come to jobs to see if
you are following saftey standards. You know like requirements to wear
hardhats, have first aid, use harnesses.
Subject. No. Nobody comes out and checks on jobs. I don't need
anybody to check on anything. I just do my work.
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PI: What about any other types of regulatory requirements?
Subject: No.
PI: Do you carry any business insurance or workman's comp?
Subject: No.
The other two participants who overpaid their taxes responded similarly to
questions regarding regulatory requirements.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis opened with a brief description of the theoretical foundations
supporting regulatory approaches to enhance business compliance with regulatory and tax
requirements. To summarize, a binary model of enforcement had been the center of
debate for researchers and policy makers (Hutter, 1989, Braithwaite, 2002). The two
approaches at issue involved command-and-control regulation grounded in principles of
rational choice theory and cooperative regulation based on normative theories. The
command-and-control approach assumes that individuals are driven by self-interest and
that compliance decisions are made based on an evaluation of the utility of considered
actions and the risk of detection and subsequent sanctions. This approach prescribes rules
and responses to violations and mandates sanctions to offset perceived benefits of
noncompliance. Cooperative regulation assumes individuals in the business community
are respectable citizens and when treated as such they will comply with rules and
regulations. Strategies to secure compliance include persuasion, negotiation and
education (Tyler, 1990).
Responsive regulation moved beyond the dichotomous debate and proposed a
"holistic approach toward regulation in which mixes of regulatory strategies appeal to the
complexity and variety of motivations underlying compliance" (Ayres and Braithwaite,
1992; Parker, 2000: 535). Responsive regulation assumes a wide range of motivations
influence business noncompliance from inadvertent error to self-interest but posits most
businesses tend toward compliance with little to no state intervention. It suggests a
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dialogue-based approach to elicit compliance backed up by willingness to use sanctions if
necessary (Braithwaite, 2002). Soliciting and maintaining engagement in the regulatory
process is a fundamental aim. In the past decade, regulatory and tax enforcement
agencies have begun to move toward programs of responsive regulation.
The motivations driving compliance are at the core of theoretical differences
among regulatory strategies. Research into motivations for regulatory compliance have a
longer history than those for tax compliance but both reach a similar conclusion: self
interest and a fear of sanctions are among many motivations that account for compliance
and noncompliance. Some of the more notable additional factors suggested to determine
compliance include civic duty, moral beliefs, perceived fairness and legitimacy of
requirements, and law complexity. Investigations aimed at understanding compliance
behavior, however, has been limited and results are not conclusive. Additionally, there
have been few qualitative studies into taxpaying behavior.
The fundamental goal of the current study was to provide an increased
•· construction industry. To
understanding of tax noncompliance in the small building and
this end, the study used qualitative interviews with 25 owners of small building and
construction firms to learn about their taxpaying behaviors, the motivations driving their
behavior and their compliance across different arenas. Five primary conclusions are
suggested from the findings of this research.
First, results lend support to the fundamental tenets of responsive regulation.
Most of the participants were engaged in the tax system and considered themselves
moderately to highly compliant. These participants reported consistently that the threat of
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financial sanctions helped motivate them to comply with basic requirements. However,
those who had been the recipients of sanctions developed resentments toward tax
authorities. The resentments led participants to adopt noncompliant behaviors by
maximizing deductions and underreporting income. One participant disengaged entirely
from the tax system after difficulties meeting sanction requirements. For those
participants disengaged from the tax system, the threat of legal consequences served little
but to perpetuate distance from the tax system or made no difference at all.
Second, most owners in the study described being unprepared to take on the
responsibilities and tax requirements of a business. Many participants recounted stories
of trial and error in learning to operate their businesses and negotiate tax obligations.
Often times, the lack of skills led to inadvertent errors and situations in which the owner
was attempting to just make ends meet. At other times, participants turned to the
assistance of an accountant or tax preparer to complete tax returns. In these cases, the
overriding goal shifted from obtaining assistance to minimizing the tax burden and
avoiding the scrutiny of tax authorities.
Third, results from the study provide evidence that taxpayers are more dynamic
than the model "amoral calculators." Likewise, tax compliance and noncompliance are
not the dichotomous dependent variables they often times appear; tax and regulatory
requirements comprise many affirmative requirements and practices through the year as
well as a lifetime. In accordance with contemporary rational choice theory, motivations
varied among the different taxpaying requirements suggesting decision making in regard
to tax compliance may be "requirement specific."
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Finally, findings concerning the most noncompliant participants paralleled
findings in the criminological literature of street offenders. Two particular findings
especially illustrate this point. For one, results suggest developing and maintaining stakes
in conformity or social capital was an important factor driving tax compliance.
Alternatively, a lack of such stakes appeared related to the most noncompliant behavior
of the most noncompliant participants. For another, the most tax noncompliant business
owners in the study were also among the most noncompliant with regulatory
requirements.
While the results of this study provide some interesting insights into taxpaying
behavior, the limitations of the study must be taken into account. Because the sample is
small and nonrandom and limited to a specific geographical region, the results cannot be
generalized to the general population of owners of small building and construction firms.
Similarly, since the study focused on one industry, results cannot be generalized to other
industries. Furthermore, in using a snowball sampling technique, the selection of
participants was dependent on the subjective referrals of the initially selected participants.
This may have led to a sample that was "densely interconnected" (Heckerthom, 2002). In
other words, the sample may be unrepresentative even for participants in the same region
and industry as in the case of this study since like social groups tend toward each other.
The limitations, however, serve to highlight the need to replicate research of this type and
to do such for other industries and in other regions. The volume of criminological
research has increased its reliability and made significant contributions to crime control
and prevention policy.
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Despite its limitations, the results of the study point to several implications that
may be important for informing policy and future research. First, the restructuring of tax
offices to offer education and assistance may be a promising goal especially considering
the lack of business and taxpaying skills displayed by participants in this study.
However, trust for tax authorities will need to improve dramatically, at least among the
participants in this study, before this goal may be realized. As results indicated, many
participants sought the help of and paid for the services of a tax adviser or preparer and in
return anticipated a reduction of their tax burden. Free assistance from IRS officials may
reduce this expectation as well as the influence of private tax advisers seeking to secure
and maintain a consumer base through services that minimize tax payments. An
additional and possibly more effective strategy on a structural level may be to incorporate
taxpaying education in the public school system.
Next, the results suggest criminological theory and research may have important
implications for the study of compliance. Criminological investigations have done much
to inform law enforcement, policy makers and the judiciary in dealing more effectively
with individuals through the criminal justice system. Replicating these types of studies in
the area of business compliance and especially noncompliance may do the same for
regulatory and tax enforcement agencies.
Finally, the results theoretically support the recent policy developments toward
responsive regulation to enhance regulatory and tax compliance. However, the recency of
these developments have inhibited research into the actual effects of these changes. This
tum in events offers many opportunities for compliance research and policy evaluation
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alike. While the legacy of criminological research may help inform investigation into
business compliance, research into changes in regulatory and tax enforcement may serve
to inform enforcement strategies in the criminal justice apparatus.

81

.,

REFERENCES

82

REFERENCES
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). 1983. Underreported
Taxable Income: The Problem and Possible Solutions. New York: AICPA.
Allingham, M. & Sandmo, A. 1972. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal
of Public Economics, 1: 323-338.
Alm, Joseph 1991. "A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting."
The Accounting Review, 66, 577-593.
Ashford, Nicolas, Christopher Ayres, and Robert F. Stone. 1985. "Using Regulation to
Change the Market for Innovation." Harvard Environmental Law Review 9: 42966.
Ayres, Ian and John Braithwaite. 1992. Responsive Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Babbie, Earl. 1998. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company.
Bajada, Christopher. 1999. "Estimates of the Underground Economy in Australia."
Economic Record, 75: 369-404.
Bansal, Pratima and Kendall Roth. 2000. "Why Companies Go Green: A Model of
Economic Responsiveness." Academy of Management Journal 43: 717-36.
Bardach, Eugene. 1989. "Moral Suasion and Taxpayer Compliance." Law & Policy 11:
49-69.
Bardach, Eugene and Robert A. Kagan. 1982. Going by the Book: The Problem of
Regulatory Unreasonableness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Baucus, Melissa S. and Janet P. Near. 1992. "Can Illegal Corporate Behavior Be
Predicted? An Event History Analysis." Academy of Management Journal 43:
717-36.
Beck, P.J. & Jung, W. 1989. "Taxpayers' Reporting Decisions and Auditing Under
Asymmetry Information". Accounting Review, 64(3), 468-487.
Becker, Gary. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of ·
Political Economy 76: 169-217.

83

Blumenthal, M. ; Christian, C. & Slemrod, Joel 1998. "The Determinants of Income Tax
fhmpliance: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota."
National
,,
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6575. Massachusetts.
Braithwaite, John. 2002. Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Braithwaite, John and Valerie Braithwaite. 2001. "An Evolving Compliance Model for
Tax Enforcement." In Neal Shover and John Paul Wright (eds.), Crimes of
Privilege, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.405-18.
Braithwaite, John and Toni Makkai. 1991. ''Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Rate Deterrence." Law and Society Review 25: 7-39.
Braithwaite, Valerie. 1995. "Games of Engagement: Postures Within the Regulatory
Community." Law& Policy 15: 327-54.
Braithwaite, Valerie. 2000. The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey. Canberra:
Centre for
; Tax System Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences, The
Australian National University.
Braithwaite, Valerie and John Braithwaite. 200 1. "An Evolving Compliance Model for
Tax Enforcement." In Neal Shover and John., Paul Wright (eds.), Crimes of
Privilege, New York: Oxford University Press.
Braithwaite, Valerie, Braithwaite, John., Gibson, Donald & Makkai, Toni. 1994.
I'
Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures and Nursing
Home Compliance. Law
and Policy, 16, 363-394.
Brooks, Neil and Anthony N. Doob. 1990. "Tax Evasion: Searching for a Theory of
Compliant Behavior." In M. L. Friedland (ed), Securing Compliance, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Cash Economy Task Force. 1998. Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy.
Canberra: Australian Taxation Office.
Carroll, John S. 1992. "How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values."
In Joel Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement,
Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Chaiken, Jan M. and Marcia R. Chaiken. 1982. Varieties of Criminal Behavior. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

84

Clinard, Marshall B. and Peter C. Yeager. 1980. Corporate Crime. New York:
Macmillan.
Coleman, James William. 1998. The Criminal Elite: Understanding White Collar
Crime. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Comish, Derek B. and Ronald V. Clarke. 1986. The Reasoning Criminal. New York:
SpringerNerlag.
....
Cromwell, Paul. 2003. In Their Own Words: Criminals
on Crime, An Anthology. Los
Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company.
Farrington, David P. 1998. "Individual Differences and Offending." In Michael Tonry
(ed.), Handbook of Crime and Punishment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feige, Edgar L. 1978. "How Big is the Irregular Economy?" Challenge November
December: 5-13.
Fleming, Zachary. 2003. "The Thrill of It All: Youthful Offenders and Auto Theft." In
Paul Cromwell (ed.), In Their Own Words: Criminals on Crime, An Anthology,
Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, pp. 99-107.
Genn, Hazel. 1993. "Business Responses to the Regulation of Health and Safety in
England." Law and Policy 15: 219-33.
Gottfredson, Michael R. and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

,,

Grabosky, Peter. 1995. "Regulation by Reward: On the Use of lncentives as Regulatory
Instruments." Law & Policy 17: 257-82.
Grasmick, Harold & Scott, W. 1982. Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A
., Petty Theft. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2,
Comparison with Grand and
213-230.
Guttman, Peter M. 1977. "Are the Unemployed, Unemployed?" Financial Analysts
Joumal September-October.
Hite, Peggy. 1997. "An Investigation of Moral Suasion and Vertical Equity Arguments on
Intended Taxpayer Noncompliance." Law & Policy 19: 1-26.
85

Internal Revenue Service. 1983. Income Tax, Compliance Research: Estimates for 19731981. Office of Assistant Commissioner (Planning, Finance and Research).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Treasury.
Internal Revenue Service. 1994. "TY 1992: Individual Tax Gap." Unpublished Internal
Revenue Service Report, Washington, DC: Department of Treasury.
James, S. & Nobes, C. 2000. The Economics of Tax,ation: Principles, Policy and
Practice. 7th edition. New York: Prentice Hall.
Johnson, John M. 2002. "In-Depth Interviewing." In Jaber F. Gubrium and James A.
Holstein (eds.), The Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 103-20.
Kagan, Robert. 1 989. "On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations." In Jeffrey A.
Roth and John T. Scholz (eds.), Tax,payer Compliance Volume 2: Social Science
Perspectives, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Kagan, Robert A. and John T. Scholz. 1984. "The 'Criminology of the Corporation' and
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies." In K. Hawkins and J. M. Thomas, Enforcing
Regulation, Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Kidder, Robert and Craig McEwen. 1 989. ''Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance." In Jeffrey A. Roth
and John T. Scholz.(eds.), Tax,payer Compliance Volume 2: Social Science
Perspectives, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Klepper, Steven and Daniel Nagin. 1989. "The Criminal Deterrence Literature:
implications for Research on Taxpayer Compliance." In Jeffrey A. Roth and John
T. Scholz.(eds.), Taxpayer Compliance Volume 2: Social Science Perspectives,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Klepper, Steven & Daniel Nagin. 1 989. The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organisation, 5(1), 1-24.
Krause, Kate. 2000. "Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity?" Public Finance
Review, 28: 395-414.
Krohn, Marvin. 2000. "Sources of Criminality: Control and Deterrence Theories." In
Joseph F. Sheeley (ed.), Criminology " A Contemporary Handbook (3rd Edition)
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
May, Peter. 2002. "Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases."
86

Presented at the Joint Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the
Canadian Laaw and Society Association, Vancouver (June 1).
Mason, Laurie and Robert Mason. 1992. "A Moral Appeal for Taxpayer Compliance:
The Case for a Mass Media Campaign." Law & Policy 14: 381-99.
McGraw, Katherine and Scholz, John T. 1991. Appeals to Civic Virtue Versus Attention
to Self-Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance. Law & Society Review, 25, 471-498.
Nobel, Peter. 2000. "Qualitative Research Results: The New Zealand Cash Economy:
A Study of Tax Evasion Amongst Small and Medium Businesses." Paper
presented at the 1st International Conference on Building a Cooperative Tax
Paying Culture. Australian National University, Canberra (December 4-5).
Pace, David. 2001. "IRS Loses Billions in Unpaid Taxes." Washington: Associated
Press, March 7, 2001.
Padilla, Felix M. 2003. "Becoming a Gang Member." In Paul Cromwell (ed.), In Their
Own Words: Criminals on Crime, An Anthology, Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury
Publishing Company, pp. 236-54.
Parker, Christine. 2000. "Reinventing Regulation Within the Corporation: Compliance
oriented Regulatory Intervention." Administration and Society 32: 529-65.
Paternoster, Raymond and Sally Simpson. 1996. "Sanction Threats and Appeal to
Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime." Law and
Society Review 30: 549-83.
Pearce, Frank and Steve Tombs. 1990. "Ideology, Hegemony, and Empiricism:
Complex Theories of Regulation." British Journal of Criminology 30: 423-443.
Pearce, Frank and Steve Tombs. 1991. "Policing Corporate 'Skid Rows."' British
Journal of Criminology 3 1 : 415-426.
Petersilia, Joan, P. W. Greenwood, and M. Lavin. 1978. Criminal Careers of Habitual
Felons. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
Peterson, Mark A. and Harriot B. Braiker. 1980. Doing Crime: A Survey of California
Prison Inmates. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castellas, and Lauren A. Benton. 1989. The Informal
Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore, MD:
The John Hopkins University Press.
87

Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. Feminist Methods in Social Research. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Richards, Lyn. 1999. Using Nvivo in Qualitative Research. London: Sage.
Roberts, M.L. & Hite, Peggy A. 1994. Progressive taxation, fairness, and compliance.
Law & Policy, 16, 27-47.
Ross, Irwin. 1980. "How Lawless Are Big Companies?" Fortune (December 1): 56-64.
Roth, Jeffrey A., John T. Scholz, and Ann Dryden Witte. 1989. Taxpayer Compliance
Volume 1: An Agenda for Research. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Rubin, Herbert J. and Riene S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of
Hearing Data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub. 1993. Crime in the Making: Pathways and
Turning Points Through Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Snider, Laureen. 1990. "Cooperative Models and Corporate Crime: Panacea or Cop
Out?" Crime and Delinquency 36: 373-90.
Sassen-Koob, Saskia. 1989. "New York City's Informal Economy." In The Informal
Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, edited by
Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castellas, and Lauren A. Benton. Baltimore, MD: The
John Hopkins University Press.
Schneider, Freidrich. 2000. "The Growth of the Shadow Economy in the OECD: Some
Preliminary Explanations." Journal of International Affairs, 53: 413-433.
Schneider, Friedrich, Valerie Braithwaite, and Monika Reinhart. 2001. "Individual
Behaviour in Australia's Shadow Economy: Facts, Empirical Findings and Some
Mysteries. Working Paper No. 19. Canberra, ACT: Center for Tax System
Integrity.
Schwartz, Richard and Sonya Orleans. 1967. On Legal Sanctions. University of Chicago
Law Review, 25, 274-300.
Shover, Neal and John Paul Wright. 2001. Crimes of Privilege: Readings in White
Collar Crime, New York: Oxford University Press.
Shover, Neal, Jenny Job, and Anne Carroll. 2000. "Organizational Capacity for
88

Responsive Regulation." Paper presented at the 1st International Conference on
Building a Cooperative Tax Paying Culture. Australian National University,
Canberra (December 4-5).
Simpson, Sally S. 1986. "The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-Level
Longitudinal Model fo Profit Squeeze." American Sociological Review 51: 85975.
Stepick, Alex. 1989. "Miami's Two Informal Sectors." In The Informal Economy:
Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, edited by Alejandro Portes,
Manuel Castellas, and Lauren A. Benton. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins
University Press.
Taylor, Natalie. 2001. "Understanding Taxpayer Attitudes Through Understanding
Taxpayer Identities." Working Paper No. 14. Canberra, Australia: Center for
Tax System Integrity.
Tracy, P., Marvin Wolfgang, and R. Figlio. 1990. Delinquency Careers in Two Birth
Cohorts. New York: Plenum.
Tyler, Tom R. 1990. Why people obey the law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Tyler, Tom R. 1998. "Trust and Democratic Governance." In Valerie Braithwaite &
Margaret Levi (Eds.), Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Warren, Carol A. B. 2002. "Qualitative Interviewing." In Jaber F. Gubrium and James
A. Holstein (Eds.), Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wickerson, J. 1995. "Managing the Risks to Revenue: A New Model for Evaluating
Taxpayer Audit Programs." Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of
Canberra, Australia.
Wolfgang, Marvin, M. Figlio, and Thornsten Sellin. 1972. The Subculture of Violence:
Towards an Integrated Theory in Cirminology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc. 1984. Taxpayer Attitudes Study: Final Report.
Public Opinion Survey Prepared for the Public Affairs Division, Internal Revenue
Service, December, 1984.

89

APPENDICES

90

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW GUIDE

91

INTERVIEW GUIDE
Demographic Information
Age
Race
Gender
Family History
Parent's marital history
Parent's occupation
Siblings
Marital History
Dependents
EducationN ocational Training
Employment History
Business History
Type of business
How learned business
How long in business
Employees
How many
Type-fulltime, parttime, regular, irregular
How paid-check, cash
Tax records-W-2, 1099
Benefits
Customers
Contract/Subcontract
Type-residential, commercial, government
Payment types-check, cash, barter
Bookkeeping Practices
Who keeps books
How keep books-payments, employee income, expenses
•.
Taxpaying Practices
File-self-employed, sole proprietor, corporate
File quarterly or annually-penalties
Deductions
Accountants
Regulatory Practices
OSHA
Licensing
Fire Codes
Workman's Compensation
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WORKING HARD FOR THE MONEY:
MOTIVATIONS FOR TAX NONCOMPLIANCE IN THE
SMALL BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
INFORMED CONSENT
It is my understanding that by agreeing to participate in the project, "Motivations Behind
Tax Noncompliance in the Small Building and Construction Industry," my rights, welfare
and privacy will be maintained in the following ways:
•

I have had the details of the research project explained to me by the project
director.

•

I understand the procedures to be used and have been made aware of the
possible risk involved.

•

All responses I give to questions will be confidential and accessible only
to the project director and her project advisor.

•

Should the results of this project be published, I will be referred to only by
a research number assigned by the project director.

•

In signing the consent form, I have not waived any of my legal rights nor
have I released this institution/agency from liability for negligence.

I have been informed of this information in (a) written _ or (b) verbal _ form. All of
my questions have been answered. If further questions arise about the project, I can call
the project director, Anne Carroll, at (865) 974-602 1 . I freely and voluntarily agree to
participate in the project.

Signature of Volunteer

Date

Signature of Witness

Date
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